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Introduction
by George Bratsiotis1 and David Cobham2
The papers in this ebook arise from a seminar on ‘German macro: How it’s Different and 
Why that Matters’, which was held at Heriot-Watt University in December 2015, with 
financial support from the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) and the 
Money, Macro & Finance Research Group (MMF). Six of the papers were presented there in 
earlier versions, and the editors sought some additional papers to complete the range of 
perspectives offered.
The starting point for the project was the question of whether the macroeconomics of the 
German political establishment does indeed differ, as it often seems to do, from standard 
western macroeconomics: in particular, the former appears to neglect demand management 
(although it may be quite interventionist in other ways), to reject debt relief and to emphasise 
structural reform designed to improve competitiveness as the (only) key to economic growth. 
How far is this true? How much of whatever difference exists is due to a well worked out set 
of ideas in the form of Ordoliberalism? How does it relate to Germany’s own experiences in 
different periods? How far is this the result of political preferences and how much do the 
idiosyncrasies of these German views matter, for the development of the Eurozone and 
indeed the health of the German economy?
Of the papers included here (published in alphabetical order of authors), the two that deal 
most explicitly with the differences between conventional and German establishment 
macroeconomics are those by Peter Bofinger and Lars Feld. Both of these are members of the 
German Council of Economic Experts, but Bofinger is a dissenting member (see for example 
his minority statement in the Council’s 2015 report on the consequences of the Greek crisis) 
whereas Feld is a leading member of the majority. Bofinger analyses the German 
‘macroeconomic policy paradigm’ and relates it both to the views of Walter Eucken, whom 
he sees as having rejected Keynesian demand management and called for price and wage 
flexibility as the way to avoid demand deficiency, and to the policies actually undertaken in 
1 University of Manchester, co-director of the Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research.
2 Heriot-Watt University.
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Europe in response to the crisis. Feld, on the other hand, argues that although Ordoliberalism 
may have played a distinctive role in the background, German macroeconomic thought is not 
so different from what can be found in the US. However, he makes no mention of the very 
different interventionist policies pursued by the US (and the UK) following the financial 
crisis, with immediate quantitative easing and other measures to boost the US economy. Feld 
also makes no mention of aggregate demand in connection with the Eurozone crisis or of the 
costs imposed on the peoples of Greece and elsewhere, and presents the widely criticized 
(particularly in the US) policies undertaken by Europe's leaders as fundamentally correct.
Michael Burda, who focuses more narrowly on German economists (as opposed to the 
political establishment), agrees with Feld in playing down the role of ordoliberal ideas, but  
argues that German economists differ from others in their failure to distinguish between 
positive and normative economics. In effect, he says, they support policies which are in the 
German national interest. One crucial point here, which is expounded most clearly by 
Bofinger, is that the German economy is significantly more open than the other large 
European economies, so that it has less to gain from national aggregate demand expansion. 
Bofinger and Burda, and Jacques Mélitz, also put emphasis on the wage moderation of 
Germany in the mid-2000s, which greatly improved Germany’s competitiveness within the 
Eurozone and therefore provided an increase in external demand.3
Panicos Demetriades stresses the neglect of the role of aggregate demand, which he says has
been prominent among German policymakers since 2005, when Angela Merkel became 
Chancellor. Bernd Hayo and Florian Neumeier relate the differences between German and 
other economists to the (strongly conservative) attitudes of the German public towards 
inflation and public debt, with these attitudes conceived as part of the ‘socialisation’ of 
German economists.4 Brigitte Granville relates Ordoliberalism to Germany’s inter-war 
experience of hyperinflation and the suppression of democracy,5 but points out that the rules 
do not always apply to Germany itself: the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, for 
example, allows larger current account surpluses than deficits, but even so has not been 
applied to Germany (which has had an average surplus above the 6% limit for many years). 
3 On this see also Carlin and Soskice (2009) and Dustmann et al. (2014).
4 See Howarth and Rommerskirchen (2015) for an alternative view. Charlotte Rommerskirchen presented some 
of this material in her contribution at the seminar, but was unable to write it up for the ebook.
5 At the seminar Wendy Carlin, who was unable to write up her contribution for this publication, related German 
attitudes also to the experience of the late 1940s and succeeding decades, in which strong German growth 
appeared to be based on structural reform and wage moderation, but benefited from a growing world economy.
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Granville’s emphasis on German economists’ pursuit of German national interests is also 
echoed, in part, by Charles Wyplosz (as well as Burda, as discussed above).
One common theme in establishment German discussions of the Eurozone crisis is the need 
to avoid arrangements which entail moral hazard, and this is key to the emphasis of the 
(majority of the) German Council of Economic Experts on the need for the ‘unity of liability 
and control’6 (which can in turn be related back to Eucken’s work, as argued by both 
Bofinger and Feld). However, the concept of moral hazard is sometimes used without much 
precision or explanation. Wyplosz, analyses it in some detail, highlighting the inappropriate 
way it which it has been applied; for example, with emphasis on the behaviour of borrowers 
rather than lenders (while bankers who stood to lose from their own bad lending decisions 
were advising core country governments to lend to periphery governments so that their loans 
could be repaid).
One lacuna in typical expositions of German macro views is the academic literature on 
expansionary fiscal contractions (EFCs) and on the growth effects of high public debt to GDP 
ratios. This literature is hardly referred to in these expositions, although curiously, one of the 
first writings on EFCs refers to the ‘German view’ (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990). David 
Cobham provides a survey of recent work in this area, showing that the empirical case for 
expansionary fiscal contractions has been essentially refuted, while the argument, (originally 
due to Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010) that high debt ratios lead to a collapse of economic 
growth, has also been shown to be theoretically questionable and empirically misguided.
On the question of how much the different views held in Germany matter, Demetriades 
discusses the influence of these views on fiscal and monetary policy discussions in the 
Eurozone, not just via the arguments of government or Bundesbank representatives in 
Brussels or Frankfurt but also through the European Popular Party in the European 
Parliament and the views of German allies such as Finland, the Netherlands and Slovakia. 
There seems little doubt that German views have carried a lot of weight and led to policy 
decisions being different and/or taken later than they might otherwise have been. Granville 
argues that the club’s rules are “stacked against the weakest members” and the “rebalancing 
mechanism is jammed”, while many others of the authors here talk about the effects of such 
6 See, for example, German Council of Economic Experts (2015), or Feld et al. (2016)
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decision-making. Demetriades draws out most clearly the implications for Greece and other 
countries: a “never ending vicious cycle of austerity”. Most authors take the view that 
German policy proposals are to the benefit of the German economy, but Granville points out 
that a permanent current account surplus cannot be to the advantage of the German 
population, while Fabian Zuleeg highlights the costs to all Eurozone countries of the current 
political stalemate.
In his contribution, Mélitz argues there is a fundamental fault line between Germany and the 
Southern members of the Eurozone. This fault line reflects Germany’s ability to use wage 
discipline to control its competitiveness and hence the demand for its products, so that it has 
no need of independent monetary (or fiscal) policy. He suggests that this fault line can be 
handled only by the creation of two separate euros, one for the North, around Germany, and 
one for the South (including France), which would be allowed to move against each other, 
with the Southern euro managed by a new central bank, which would operate arrangements 
for joint deposit insurance and joint bank resolution. 
Fabian Zuleeg focuses on the policy response to the Eurozone crisis and the extent to which it 
has been shaped by German views. He emphasises that Germany has not always got its way: 
there have been bailouts, and the European Central Bank is now finally doing quantitative 
easing. Moreover, its influence is stronger in crisis situations, where it wields some kind of 
veto, than in the day-to-day construction of new rules. The implication is that Europe is not 
becoming ‘more German’ in any simple way; rather, Europe is stymied: “what Europe needs 
is more Germany, but a Germany that recognises that its relative hegemony implies that it 
needs to take the lead in constructing European compromises”, compromises which can
enable the crisis to be overcome.
What should we conclude from all this? One clear message that emerged from this 
conference, particularly from contributors who have a good inside knowledge of the
implementation of European economic policy, is that economic policy decisions are heavily 
affected by political and legal factors and processes, combined with conflicting economic 
preferences driven mainly by self-interest, but also by traditional views and different 
perceptions about ‘debt’. Germany, being clearly the economic, but also to a large degree the 
political, ‘hegemon’ in this European Union, inevitably bears the greatest responsibility for 
Europe’s policy responses to the 2007 global financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone 
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crisis. In the German political (and to a lesser extent academic) establishment, there is a 
preference for structural reform over demand management and a strong opposition to both 
debt relief and debt itself and these reflect perceived German national interests as well as 
specific economic perspectives. These preferences have in turn had a major influence on the 
policy response to the recent financial and Eurozone crisis and may fully explain the 
economic indecision and political stalemate that has characterised European economic policy 
in recent years.   
Therefore, one clear conclusion from all this is that Europe has an urgent need for further 
debate and discussion that will help identify the economic policy and legislative reforms that 
need to be introduced in order to ensure that European economic policy will always place 
Eurozone-wide interests above national interests and perceived national populist views and 
traditions. We hope this small volume will contribute to this debate. 
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German macroeconomics: the long shadow of Walter Eucken
by Peter Bofinger1
1 Introduction
There is no doubt that the macroeconomic debate and actual macroeconomic policy in 
Germany differ considerably from other countries. At first sight this is difficult to explain, as 
in academia the same textbooks and models are used as in other countries. But behind the 
formal theoretical apparatus stands a specific paradigm of macroeconomics which was
developed by Walter Eucken and which is diametrically opposed to Keynesian economics. 
From the experience of the Great Depression Keynes drew the conclusion that active demand 
management is necessary. Eucken, however, developed from the specific German experience 
of the 1930s a theory according to which ‘full employment policy’ leads to a centrally 
planned economy. While Keynes saw the Depression as a result of the inherent instability of 
the market economy, Eucken attributed it to an insufficient flexibility of wages and an 
inadequate monetary order. In his view with flexible prices and wages and an adequate 
monetary order the instability of the market system can be avoided. Eucken’s dismissal of 
macroeconomic policy helps to explain the German focus on balanced budgets, price stability 
and structural reforms and the neglect of aggregate demand at the German as well as at the 
European level. The obvious fact that the German economy did quite well with this approach 
can be explained by its very pronounced openness. Thus in spite of its size Germany can be 
regarded as a relatively small economy which can rely on the rest of the world to sustain its 
aggregate demand. As this is not the case with the Eurozone (EZ), the application of the 
German paradigm leads to negative outcomes. 
2 The German macroeconomic policy paradigm
The German macroeconomic policy paradigm rest on three pillars: 
- An almost religious fixation2 on balanced fiscal budgets which reflects a very 
sceptical assessment of the effectiveness of demand management and the ability of 
1 Universität Würzburg and CEPR, member of German Council of Economic Experts
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governments to identify profitable investment projects. In 2009 this philosophy was legally 
enshrined in the so-called debt brake which has become a part of the federal constitution. The   
‘fiscal compact’ which was enacted in 2012 obliges the other member states to implement 
similar regulations in their national constitutions. The neglect of the demand side effects of 
fiscal policy shapes the German approach to the EZ crisis and the insistence on austerity at 
any price.3
- A very strong preference for price stability as the overarching target of monetary 
policy with an asymmetric tolerance for deviations. While inflation rates above the ECB’s 
target of “below, but close to 2%” are regarded as dangerous, to many economists the actual 
EZ inflation rate of 1% is not a matter of concern (Issing 2016).
- A deep conviction that flexible prices are the most important contribution to the 
solution of unemployment problems. This is reflected in the German ‘wage moderation’ of 
the years 2000 to 2007 which was designed as a strategy to reduce unemployment in 
Germany (Bofinger 2016). This also explains the plea of German economists for structural 
reforms as the main solution to the problems in the EZ. 
This specific German paradigm has effectively shaped German macroeconomic policy, which 
stands in strong contrast to the policies of other major economies. This applies above all to 
fiscal policy since the crisis. While the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan allowed 
very high deficits for a prolonged period of time, in Germany the deficit was rather limited 
and already in 2011 it was almost back to balance (Chart 1). 
A German influence can also be identified in the monetary policy of the ECB. Its reaction to 
the Great Recession was much weaker than the reaction of other major central banks. In 2011 
the ECB even raised its policy rate although the EZ was in the middle of the crisis. And while 
the other major central banks had started comprehensive quantitative easing programs rather 
early, the ECB waited until 2015. 
2 This is reflected in the label of the ‘black zero’ which describes the slight budget surplus of the German 
Federal Government since 2014. It is celebrated in the media and the public as an epochal achievement.  
3 An example of the complete neglect of the demand side effects of austerity is provided by the analysis of the 
‘Greek Tragedy’ by Hans-Werner Sinn (2015, p. 10). This leads him to the question: “At first sight, it may seem 
puzzling that Greece’s economy, despite the huge financial help it has received, has not improved and actually 
appears sicker than ever.” But instead of referring to the effects of an “unprecedented” budget consolidation 
(IMF 2013, p. 39 ), he presents an odd ‘Dutch disease’ story. 
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Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, Annex Tables
The German approach to unemployment is reflected in the development of unit labour costs.
With the exception of Japan, since the start of the monetary union all the other major 
advanced countries have had much stronger increases in unit labour costs than Germany 
(Chart 2).
Source: European Economy, Statistical Appendix
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Whatever one may think of the German macroeconomic paradigm there is no doubt that it 
has been relatively beneficial for German economic performance at least in the longer run 
(Chart 3). While German growth was weaker than in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, it was in line with France and better than in Italy and Japan. Especially impressive 
is the reduction of unemployment in Germany since 2005. 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database
3 The living heritage of Walter Eucken
At first sight the specific macroeconomic policy paradigm is difficult to explain. German 
university students read the same macroeconomic textbooks as students in other countries and 
at the advanced level the standard DSGE models are taught and applied. But behind the 
formal theoretical apparatus one can identify a specific paradigm to economic policy which is 
called ‘Ordnungspolitik’ and which in this form does not exist in other countries. While there 
are no university courses on this topic, ‘Ordnungspolitik’ plays an important role in German 
academic debate on policy issues and actual economic policy.
For an understanding of this paradigm it is useful to have a closer look at the works of Walter 
Eucken (1891-1950). Eucken taught at Freiburg University from 1927 until his death and he 
is regarded as the spiritus rector (guiding spirit) of the so-called ‘Freiburger Schule’. The 
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Chart 3: Real gross domestic product (1999=100)
France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States
German macro: how it’s different and why that matters
recent celebrations of his 125th birthday underline his impact for present-day policy makers. 
In her speech at this occasion Angela Merkel (2016) emphasized that the principles of the 
‘Freiburger Schule’ had lost nothing in relevance and importance. 4
Walter Eucken’s philosophy of economics can be presented in a positive and a negative 
message (Oliver 1960). The positive message is presented in his ‘constitutive’ and ‘regulatory 
principles’.  Without going into detail these principles do not look very original, they are 
almost trivia.5 As Oliver (1960) argues they are very similar to the programme which was 
developed by the Chicago School, above all by Henry Simons (1948).6 In fact, most 
economists outside Germany would more or less agree with these principles as a precondition 
for an optimum allocation of resources. 
Table 1: Eucken’s constituent (K) and regulatory (R) principles
K1 Functioning price system
K2 Primacy of the monetary order
K3 Open markets
K4 Private property
K5 Freedom of contract
K6 Liability [legal]
K7 Continuity of economic policy
R1 Antitrust policy
R2 Income policy
R3 Correction of externalities
R4 Correction of anomalous labour supply
Source: Van Suntum et al. (2011)
4 „Die ordoliberalen Grundsätze der Freiburger Schule haben nichts an Aktualität und Bedeutung verloren.“ 
And: „Vieles, was heute aktuell ist, baut auf der Arbeit großer ökonomischer Vordenker auf, unter denen Walter 
Eucken zweifellos eine ganz besondere Rolle einnimmt. Seine ordnungspolitischen Grundsätze helfen immer 
wieder, den Blick für das Ganze nicht zu verlieren. Sie sind verständlich und geben Orientierung.”  
5 See for instance Vanberg (2011, p.6): “The ordo-liberalism of the Freiburg School starts from the very premise 
that the market order is a constitutional  order, that it is defined by its institutional framework and, as such, 
subject to (explicit or implicit) constitutional choice.  It assumes that the working properties of market processes 
depend on the nature of the legal-institutional frameworks within which they take place, and that the issue of 
which rules are and which are not desirable elements of such frameworks ought to be judged as a constitutional 
issue,  i.e. in terms of the  relative desirability of relevant constitutional alternatives.”
6 See Henry C. Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948
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For the macroeconomic policy paradigm the more interesting elements of Eucken’s 
philosophy concern his negative messages. They include not only an outright dismissal of 
central planning which was prevalent at the time when Eucken was active but also a very 
strong critique of what he calls the ‘policy of full employment’. He uses this term for a 
Keynesian style expansionary fiscal policy but without mentioning Keynes. In his works 
Eucken only discusses the German experience in the 1930s which was dominated by the 
takeover of the Nazi government in 1933. Eucken draws a direct line from the ‘policy of full 
employment’ to price controls, rationing and central planning:
“Thus the policy of full employment, like the corporative structure of the labour market, 
resulted in a marked tendency towards central control of the economy. The one, like the 
other, was conducive to an unstable economic system with a tendency to move in the 
direction of central control. So there were two strong historical forces impelling German 
economic policy along the path to central control: firstly, the formation of comprehensive 
economic and social pressure groups, and secondly, the policy of full employment.” (Eucken 
1952a, p. 60)
Thus, it was not the Nazis that brought Germany under dictatorship, but trade unions (the 
“corporative structure of the labour market”) and Keynesian demand policies. The complete 
neglect of the extreme political situation in Germany in the years from 1933 to 1945 also 
becomes obvious in Eucken’s analysis of the consequences of Hitler’s economic policy:
“It is one [a disturbance, P.B.] in which, though all factors are engaged, human activities are 
not properly co-ordinated and investments are not in line with one another, with the result 
that bottlenecks form.” (Eucken 1952a, p. 80)
A more awkward description of the German war economy is difficult to imagine. From this 
very flawed analysis of the German experience in the years 1933 to 1945 Eucken develops a 
general theory of ‘full employment policy’.
“Thus, our review of the German experience leads us to a grave and serious conclusion: 
Economic policy is faced with a dilemma: on the one hand, mass unemployment necessitates 
a full employment policy; on the other the policy of full employment makes for an instability 
on other markets, which is extremely dangerous, and in addition forces economic policy in 
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the direction of central planning. This dilemma is perhaps the most crucial economic and 
social problem of our time.” (Eucken 1952a, p. 66).  
In the path from ‘full employment policy’ to centralization Eucken sees an important role for
inflation:
“Not only did the inflations destroy the price system and hence all free types of economic 
order, not only did they engender or decisively foster the tendency to central planning, but 
they were also a precondition for the existence of central planning.” (Eucken 1952a, p. 73)
Eucken’s solution to the dilemma is related to his analysis of the main causes of the deflation
in the years 1929-33.7 In his view, price and wages were not sufficiently flexible:
“In the crisis year, 1931, Berlin builders, for instance, had to reckon with relatively firm 
prices of materials, such as iron and cement, which were fixed by syndicates, and also with 
relatively fixed wages, where housing prices were dropping rapidly.” (Eucken 1952a, p. 78) 
In addition, the monetary system had a destabilizing effect on the economy:
“When price fell, money contracted further, and so on indefinitely, the fall in prices causing 
contraction of money and a further fall in prices. “ (Eucken 1952a, p. 67) 
This leads Eucken to the conclusion:
“It can be firmly established that unstable market forms and monetary systems are bound to 
lead to cumulative depression and mass unemployment. This being so, economic policy 
should concentrate on developing systems conducive to market equilibrium, and in this
respect the configuration of the monetary system is particularly important.” (Eucken 1952a, 
p. 67) 
And if this can be properly organised, a permanently stable equilibrium can be reached:
7 In his book „Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik“ (Eucken 1952b, p. 309) he even goes so far as to explain the 
outbreak of the Great Depression as the result of  demand management in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Germany. 
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“The policy of full employment will then no longer be necessary and the great dilemma will 
have been overcome.” (Eucken 1952a, p. 67)
These are strong conclusions. They stand in some contrast to Eucken’s view on the theory of 
the business cycle that he develops in his book Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie (Principles 
of Economics). In this book (Eucken 1949) he adopts a completely agnostic standpoint. He 
maintains that theories trying to make general statements on seemingly regularly occurring 
changes in economic development are bound to fail.8
All in all Eucken’s economic philosophy can be regarded as the complete antithesis to 
Keynes. As Riese (1972) argued, both Eucken and Keynes were children of the Great 
Depression.9 But while Keynes developed a theory which explains why market economies 
are not perfectly self-stabilizing even if prices are fully flexible, Eucken saw the instability as 
caused by insufficient price flexibility and a destabilizing monetary system. Thus, Riese 
(1972, p. 45) is correct when he argues that the messages of Keynes and Eucken are 
incompatible.10
In retrospect it is quite astonishing that Eucken thought he could develop general economic 
principles from the very specific historical experience of Germany in the years 1933 to 
1945.11 It may be due to the difficult times when he was writing his books that he does not 
make any explicit reference to the dictatorship of the Nazis and the very specific economic 
and political conditions of a country that is in a ‘total war’. It is also difficult to explain why 
Eucken does not discuss the writings of John Maynard Keynes that were published in the 
1930s or, for example, those of Hayek (1929). In fact he does not make any specific reference 
to the leading economists of his time or to the vast theoretical literature on economic cycles 
8 Eucken (1949, p. 182): „Es gibt keinen Normal-Zyklus der Natur. Daraus ergibt sich, dass „dynamische 
Theorien“ oder „Konjunkturtheorien“, die allgeingültige Aussagen über angeblich regelmäßig wiederkehrende 
Verschiebungen des konkreten wirtschaftlichen Alltags versuchen, scheitern müssen.“ (Italics by Eucken)
9 Riese (1972, p. 45): „Während KEYNES die Grundlagen der damals herrschenden neoklassischen Theorie 
daraufhin untersuchte, ob sie noch zur Erklärung des Wirtschaftsablaufes ausreichte und aus der Einsicht in ihre 
Mängeleine Theorie der staatlichen Aktivität entstand, ergriff EUCKEN das Grauen über die Schlechtigkeit der 
Welt und er empfahl die Zuflucht zum Mythos einer natürlichen Ordnung. KEYNES ist, so gesehen, die 
angelsächsische, EUCKEN die deutsche Antwort auf die Weltwirtschaftskrise.“
10 In the 1960s the German Finance Minister Karl Schiller tried to reach “a synthesis of the Freiburg imperative 
with the Keynesian message” (“Synthese zwischen Freiburger Imperativ und keynesianischer Botschaft”). But 
Eucken would not have agreed to this. 
11 This is even more astonishing as Eucken (1949, p. 183) explicitly argues that economic developments should 
be regarded as elements of the concrete historical situation. 
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that was available at the time he worked. Eucken also makes no attempt to support his 
reasoning with any statistical material. The severe limitations of his analyses and his 
complete unawareness of this may be regarded as a symptom of the isolation of German 
intellectuals under the comprehensive totalitarianism of the Nazis and the growing 
devastations of World War II.12 In fact, Eucken died as early as March 1950 so he had almost 
no chance to discuss his views with a broader international academic community. 
If one compares Eucken’s narrow macroeconomic analyses with the comprehensive theories 
of Keynes, Hayek or Schumpeter his long-standing popularity and reputation in Germany is 
hard to understand. Above all there is no doubt his crude dismissal of ‘full employment 
policies’ has been refuted by the evidence. Jewkes (1952a), who wrote an introduction to the 
English translation of Eucken’s works, mentioned the rather successful full employment 
policies of the United States and the United Kingdom which did not lead to a centrally 
planned economy. And since then repeated applications of ‘full employment policies’ have
contributed to macroeconomic stabilization in the global economy without leading to central 
planning. On the contrary, the centrally planned economies have lost ground in many 
countries. 
In the 1950s Eucken’s popularity in Germany can be explained by a lack of 
internationalisation of the German academic community. But today it is difficult to 
understand why German politicians and academics still regard him as an outstanding 
economist and why his philosophy still shapes the German paradigm of macroeconomics. 
One explanation could be that he is simply used as a symbol of a neoliberal approach and that 
most of his followers have never read his works on macroeconomic issues.  
But there is no doubt that Eucken’s heritage is very much alive in the German 
macroeconomic paradigm as it has been already described:
- Eucken’s aversion to ‘full employment policy’ by means of fiscal policy is reflected 
in the German approach to fiscal policy at the national and the European level;
12 This intellectual isolation is confirmed by Vanberg (2011, p.6): “(…) the Freiburg ordo-liberalism appears to 
be an essentially original German “invention” for which no significant direct influences from other sources can 
be discerned.”
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- Eucken’s negative attitude towards trade unions and corporatism is reflected in 
proposals for ‘structural reforms’ which reduce the bargaining power of trade unions;
- Eucken’s theory that inflation destroys “all free types of economic order” (p.73) 
shapes the German attitude towards monetary policy.
4 Why has German macroeconomic policy been successful?
The strong support for the anti-Keynesian paradigm in Germany can be explained by the 
quite successful economic performance of the German economy since World War II and 
again since the mid-2000s. Given the limitations of the theoretical framework of the German 
Ordnungspolitik this raises an obvious conundrum. It can be solved if one takes into account 
the relatively large size of the German economy and its pronounced openness. In terms of 
GDP German is the third largest economy in the group of advanced economies (Chart 4).   
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database
But in terms of openness (exports as percent of GDP) Germany ranks among relatively small 
economies (Chart 5). Due to this openness the German economy is able to follow a passive 
macroeconomic policy approach as it strongly benefits from macroeconomic policies pursued 
in other major countries. In other words the German economy is supported by the ‘full 
employment policies’ of other countries. This is reflected in the very large fiscal deficits in all 
other major economies in the period after 2007 which successfully helped to avoid a 
reappearance of the Great Depression. In other words, the German economy is supported by 
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Chart 4: GDP based on purchasing power parity valuation of countries
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the demand management policies of other countries that are heavily criticized by mainstream 
German economists.  
Source: World Economic Outlook Database
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German macroeconomics or German macroeconomists?1
by Michael C. Burda2
1 Introduction
It is an understatement to say that economics in Germany is getting a bad rap these days. 
Economists in this country are made out to be living in a different universe, harping on 
nonexistent problems, endorsing austerity when it is least needed, committing the fallacy of 
composition at every possible juncture, and simply getting it wrong. In particular, German 
macroeconomics has been under intense scrutiny in the international press. In this essay I 
would like to come to the defense of Germany’s economists, at least partially, by arguing that 
the positions they take – especially in the public debate – reflect national interests in a very 
crowded and self-interested European theatre. Whether or not they should be doing it in the 
way they do is another, and not uncontroversial, matter. But they are doing it, and there can 
be little doubt about that.
2 The Wisdom of the Wise Men
Let’s start with the ‘wise men’ - the Sachverständigenrat (the German Council of Economic 
Experts). This independent advisory council was established in 1966 as an independent 
source of expertise, summarized in its weighty annual report.  The Council has been the butt 
of considerable criticism, some in this volume; it has rejected debt relief for Europe’s 
periphery, Eurobonds, and the minimum wage as well as, more recently, the continuation of 
monetary easing. It is often characterized by its detractors as a hotbed of voodoo economics 
detached from current academic research standards.3
Nothing could be further from the truth. Members of the Council publish in serious academic 
journals, belong to respectable international scholarly associations, and cook with the same 
1 This essay is based on a “Letter from Germany” for the Royal Economic Society Newsletter, July 2015. I am 
grateful to Wolfgang Franz, Volker Wieland, and Charles Wyplosz for useful discussions.  
2 Humboldt University Berlin .
3 See for example “Of Rules and Order” in the Economist 9 May 2015. The steady tirades of the New York 
Times’ Paul Krugman and the FT’s Martin Wolf have received support from Wolfgang Munchau, who wrote 
about “Wacky economics” in the Financial Times (FT, 16 November 2014) and Simon Wren-Lewis on his 
mainly macro blog about deranged Teutonic world views.
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utensils as other economists.  The ‘wise men’ are expected to provide independent and 
sometimes unwanted advice to the government in the form of an annual report. They are not 
partisan advocates of government policy; they are expected, however, to advise in the 
perceived interests of the country. While not specified in the original legislation, a tradition 
has emerged that sitting governments consider and consult with corporatist interests – labour, 
industry, finance – when nominating Council members. Evidently this is a tradition which 
ebbs and flows with the political importance of economic issues of the day. While my friends 
on the Council would certainly deny any influence-peddling or quids pro quo, it is seems 
unlikely that those appointed on the ‘trade union ticket’ (e.g. Peter Bofinger) would be more 
likely to criticize the minimum wage or increases thereof than a member nominated after 
consultation with employers’ associations (e.g. Volker Wieland). If there is influence, 
however, it is orders of magnitude more subtle: rather than acting at the behest of those who 
nominated them, it is more probable that potential candidates are vetted beforehand and pass 
muster, meaning they may be nominated as much for their normative leanings as their 
positive prowess.4
Yet despite this, the Council has exhibited much more independence than might be expected. 
It is noteworthy that Wolfgang Franz, first nominated by the trade unions for the period 1994-
1999, was not asked to return for a second term.5 This was a consequence of his public 
endorsement of wage moderation as a response to long-standing malaise in the German 
labour market in the 1990s, when unemployment more than doubled and could hardly be 
interpreted as demand-deficient. Most economists, including most in the UK, recognized the 
German situation as the consequence of an overvalued exchange rate caused by reunification 
and locked in by the adoption of the euro. Later Franz would be nominated by the 
‘employers’ side’ and actively supported the vaunted (and successful) ‘Hartz’ labour market 
reforms, effectively implementing the internal devaluation predicted by Calmfors (1995).
Peter Bofinger, a contributor to this conference volume, was also nominated by the trade 
unions and has cast a number of dissenting pro-union votes on issues related to aggregate 
demand, minimum wage and other labour market policies. Similarly, Volker Wieland, a 
4 In the Council’s enabling legislation (“Gesetz über die Bildung eines Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung 
der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung“ of 14 August 1963), it is stated explicitly that members of the Council 
may neither be members of the government or governmental bodies (except professors or heads of economic 
research institutes), nor represent or be employed by the trade unions or employers’ associations directly. 
5 Private conversation with W. Franz, February 2016. This is oddly reminiscent of the fate suffered by Martin 
Feldstein when he, as Chairman of US President Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers, criticized the large 
deficits resulting from the administration’s tax cuts.  
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distinguished and widely-cited expert on monetary policy, recently endorsed an end to ECB 
quantitative easing in what could be interpreted as a Frankfurt-friendly position, as German 
banks and their business model have suffered under the regime of Mario Draghi. Under the 
aegis of Christoph Schmidt, the Council has frequently slammed the current Grand Coalition 
government’s policy mix, especially its choice of minimum wage level and its backtracking 
on family and retirement policy. 
3 Positive v. Normative Economics
Yet all this does not indict the state of economic science or research in Germany, but rather 
points to the perils of taking policy positions. Lionel Robbins famously enjoined us to refrain 
from normative judgments and to stick to ‘positive economics’: 
“All this is not to say that economists should not deliver themselves on ethical or normative 
questions, any more than an argument that botany is not concerned with aesthetics is to say 
that botanists should not have views of their own on the laying-out of gardens. Whatever may 
be our philosophical views as to the possibility of scientific ethics, as social beings we have 
to assume some such conception, and there is no reason why economists alone among their 
fellows should deny themselves the liberty of dogmatising. On the contrary, it is highly 
desirable that they should not do so.” (Robbins, 1927)
It is remarkably ironic that the original law which created the Sachverständigenrat in 1963 
tasked its members with producing impartial economic assessment and analysis, while 
proscribing specific policy recommendations.6 In practice, the Council frequently issues 
normative judgments that often contradict positions taken by the government, not to speak of 
economists from other Eurozone countries, the UK, or the United States.  Salient examples 
are their anti-minimum wage stance, the criticism of quantitative easing, the endorsement of 
fiscal consolidation in face of flagging aggregate demand in the Eurozone, and their proposal 
of a Europe-wide sovereign debt relief programme. Yet it is natural to expect these 
6 „Der Sachverständigenrat soll Fehlentwicklungen und Möglichkeiten zu deren Vermeidung oder deren 
Beseitigung aufzeigen, jedoch keine Empfehlungen für bestimmte wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Maßnahmen 
aussprechen.“ (The Council of Experts should point out adverse developments and possible options towards 
ameliorating them, nevertheless make no recommendations for particular economic and social policy 
measures.”) See Gesetz über die Bildung eines Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung der 
Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (1963) §2.
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recommendations to reflect a national perspective, especially when national taxpayers are on 
the hook. 
The members of the Council of Economic Experts are not lobbyists, but are chosen to assess 
the state of the economy and make recommendations, presumably in the interest of the 
nation’s economic well-being. Thus, it would be completely wrong to claim that members of 
the Council are shills for the government’s policies. In my two decades in Germany, I have 
observed an increasing tendency for the Council to issue policy recommendations and even 
criticize sitting governments. Clearly they are doing so because their writ is to further 
German national and economic interests, not to provide a pure positivistic evaluation of 
where the economy is going and what, for example, a fiscal expansion or tax cut would do to 
aggregate demand, inflation, and unemployment. This alone would be pretty uninteresting 
and significantly less glamorous, and it is not surprising that the Council has gone much 
further, and thus winds up on the front lines of political discussion.7
Nevertheless, there remains a significant mythology about German economics – also 
motivating this conference volume – which I would like to refute most vigorously. In what 
follows, I will try to de-mystify German economics by showing it to be a reflection of 
particular German economists, who in turn are thinking of national interests, for better or 
worse. 
4 Myth #1: Economists in Germany fundamentally reject Keynesian ideas 
This is nonsense. The importance of aggregate demand in the short-run determination of 
output and employment is standard, not only in the courses I teach in Berlin, but in those 
given by all colleagues I know who teach macro. (That includes Peter Bofinger, who 
certainly knows better than to claim to be the ‘last Mohican’ of Keynesian thought). People 
conveniently forget that Germany was out front implementing Keynesian ideas in the years 
before the war - Keynes even said as much, somewhat ignominiously, in his preface to the 
first German edition of the General Theory. During post-war reconstruction, Economics 
Minister Karl Schiller’s central focus was on Globalsteuerung (aggregate demand 
7 When I was invited in 2003 to serve on the Council, the ‘invitation’ came from the ‘industry ticket’ and it was 
clear to me that members are under enormous political pressure inconsistent with my own research goals. I 
concluded that there would not be much room for manoeuvre and in the end, I declined the offer.
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management). In fact, provisions of the Stabilitätsgesetz of 1967 (the law which mandated 
demand management policy) explicitly address economic growth, inflation, unemployment 
and the current account balance as the ‘impossible square’ and even provide for contingent 
fiscal policy projects off-the-shelf which could be implemented in times of recession or crisis. 
Germany reacted as vigorously to the Great Recession as its EU partners.  Volker Wieland, a 
member of the Council, has contributed widely to a literature based on the premise that 
monetary policy has persistent and real effects on the economy in the short to medium run –
hardly unorthodox. 
So why the current stubborn resistance to Globalsteuerung in most German policy circles? 
My take on this – which the reader can take or leave - is simply national interest. First, the 
Anglo-Saxon world has an exaggerated view of Germany’s role in the global economy (in 
fact, the share in world GDP is a whopping 4.9%), and even in EU Europe (only about 22%). 
An all-out Keynesian pump-priming binge in Germany would surely reduce its current 
account surplus, but wouldn’t put much of a dent in world or even EU aggregate demand. 
Second, Germany is an open economy with the sum of exports and imports as a fraction of 
GDP equalling almost 90% - compare this with Italy, Spain, France and the UK, which range 
from 55 to 65%. Those who can still remember the old-fashioned multiplier know that it 
moves inversely with the marginal propensity to import. Even a ‘Neanderthal’ or ‘hydraulic’
Keynesian would have to question the benefits accruing to Germany from such a policy. It is 
disingenuous to expect individual sovereign countries to engage in aggregate demand policy 
for the benefit of others if domestic voters themselves can’t be convinced of their own 
welfare gains. 
Finally, most modern macroeconomists have a more nuanced view of fiscal demand 
management and the multiplier – and would reject the hydraulic Keynesian view of the world 
in which prices are constant and consumers mechanically spend a constant fraction of their 
income. A more modern perspective holds that only income-constrained households matter 
for the multiplier – it would be simply silly to argue that 100% or even half of highly banked 
German households consume hand-to-mouth from disposable income. While remarkable 
consensus has been reached that fiscal policy at the zero lower bound is effective, this also 
only applies to closed economies and only as long as the good faith and credit of borrowing 
countries remains intact. Incidentally, a lively discussion in Germany is currently underway 
among mainstream economists, led by Carl Christian von Weizsäcker and Marcel Fratzscher, 
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who have endorsed taking advantage of government low interest rates and investing in 
infrastructure, with both short-run Keynesian and long-term supply-side gains.
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5 Myth #2: German economists feed at the trough of ‘Ordoliberalism’ and worship 
at the altar of supply side policies 
Many of the more disparaging articles I mentioned in the introduction criticize 
‘Ordoliberalism.’ Ordoliberalism is defined in Wikipedia (presumably by its proponents) as a 
liberal (i.e. free market) regime with relatively stable rules to control the excesses of 
unbridled capitalism. Allegedly, it arose around the rejection of state socialism under the 
Nazi regime, and embodies ideas of Hayek, in particular a strong preference for decentralized 
market outcomes over state planning as well as an endorsement of the rule of law. Going 
after anti-trust violators and supporting a framework for stable contractual relations 
(especially loan contracts) are favourite elements of Ordnungspolitik; a friendly interpretation 
would draw in macroeconomic principles favouring rules over discretion. While this sounds 
harmless, it doesn’t represent economic science based on mainstream methods of our field, 
and never was. While it might be interpreted as a normative analysis of regulatory regimes, 
Ordnungspolitik does not stem from the rigorous analysis we are accustomed to, but derives 
from an Austrian (i.e. Hayekian) rejection of formal analysis of these questions. 
Ordoliberalism is best described as a strong policy preference, perhaps even elevated to the 
status of religion. I have never seen a serious analysis of the welfare effects of an ordoliberal 
regime. But maybe I am reading the wrong journals. 
As far as the supply side is concerned, the story is different. There is very good rigorous 
analysis – also from Germany, on how changes in labour market regulations, the welfare 
state, taxation, and the efficiency of job search can affect the long-term productive potential 
of economies. The success of the Hartz labour market reforms a decade ago is proof that 
supply-side policies can work; it is no accident that since 2003 employment, stagnant for 
decades, has risen by 13% (Burda 2016). In the decade after unification, Germany had lost 
enormous competitiveness and was the Economist’s sick man of Europe. Post-unification 
inflation had raised nominal wages while European integration was putting downward 
pressure on prices. Paying for unification without explicit tax increases meant going through 
the back door of social security contributions, which led to elevated payroll taxes and 
severely distorted labour markets. The reforms of 2003-2005 addressed those problems at the 
expense of political careers; a decade later Germany can celebrate its labour market 
successes. 
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It is not surprising that Germans, who had to wait long enough for their own supply-side 
reforms to work, have considerably less patience for short-term views of the world and tend 
to think in terms of chains of Keynesian short runs, which eventually must be made 
consistent with what policy wants to do in the long run. This may be hard to deal with, but it 
is not voodoo economics, and goes pretty far in explaining Germany’s focus on reforms in 
the current Greek drama. 
6 Myth #3: Economists in Germany obsess on moral hazard and austerity 
Attitudes towards moral hazard and austerity are always in the eyes of the beholder. It’s 
hardly surprising that Germany is more interested in sustainable solutions to southern 
European problems (and hopefully the lending practices in the north that gave rise to them) as 
opposed to the recipient perspective of kicking the can down the road and hoping that 
structural problems go away on their own. In principle, governments should practice austerity 
in good times, not bad. Along with France, Germany failed to impose the stability rules and 
sanctions on themselves in 2003 – after insisting throughout the Maastricht Treaty 
negotiations on tough membership criteria for monetary union as well as the Stability and 
Growth Pact. The obiter dictum of consistency now dictates that Germany toe the line on 
austerity or risk losing all credibility on fiscal discipline in the monetary union.  The coming 
fiscal consequences of the refugee crisis will challenge this fiscal discipline, possibly at the 
risk of losing the monetary union in the process. 
To the extent that policymaking is the product of the interactions of hard-nosed politicians 
and policymakers, a positive analysis of economic policy yields high returns. Economists 
here certainly do take a much more cynical view of policy and political economy. When I 
arrived in Berlin in the early 1990s, the discussion surrounding the European Monetary 
Union project was uniformly sceptical.  The suspicion was that politicians do what they 
please in response to short-term political incentives, not what our models predict for policy in 
a vacuum. In view of current events, those sceptics were pretty much on the mark. 
Germans understand intimately the pitfalls and political economy of moral hazard and it is 
hardly surprising that their economists have similar views. The states of Germany are jointly 
and severally liable for each other’s debt; predictably, the smaller states have allowed their 
debt to soar since the 1980s in the aftermath of structural decline and despite promises to 
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balance budgets. Bremen’s debt per capita increased from about 5000 EUR in 1980 to 30000 
in 2015, or 500%; in Saarland, it rose from 1600 EUR per capita to almost 14000 EUR or 
775% (for the country, debt per capita increased ‘only’ by 200% over the same period). 
While it appears plausible and perhaps unavoidable to bail out Bremen, Saarland (or Berlin), 
doing the same for 10 million Greeks is another question. Understandably, moral hazard 
becomes a categorical imperative.
7 Conclusion: National Interests trump positive economics 
An important line of defence of German economists is simply projection of national interests. 
To paraphrase Clausewitz, national economic policy is war prosecuted by other means. 
Because many German academics cannot separate the normative from the positive, simple 
patriotism can wind up expressed as bad economics. Yet it is surely disingenuous and 
certainly incorrect to implicate the belief system of economists of a country when one 
disagrees with the policies their government is following, even if these policies sometimes fly 
in the face of mainstream economics and economists. 
I have tried to debunk myths circulating in the media and the blogosphere about ‘the way 
German economists think,’ and argue that the input of those economists into many national 
policies is greatly exaggerated. This does not exonerate Germany for choosing policy 
advising institutions which claim to be independent and non-partisan on the one hand, yet are 
tasked with advocating German interests on the other. Nor does it excuse economists in 
Germany for the sin of making gratuitous policy pronouncements without cleanly separating 
the normative from the positive.  But the facts remain: For its size, Germany is more open 
than any other European country, and thus is likely to be sceptical about the national benefits 
of demand stimulus; Germany cheated on the Maastricht criteria in 2003 with France and 
destroyed considerable credibility regarding fiscal probity; Germany has had a string of bad 
experiences with its own federal states in a system of joint and collective liability.  
Rather than ordoliberal religion, economics in Germany is a mixture of national self-interest 
and healthy mistrust informed by experience. Like every European nation and above all the 
UK, Germany sees itself as part of a mosaic of self-interested sovereign nations. The sober 
reality is that each has its own history of “long-standing animosities based on history, 
nationality, and religion” (Feldstein 1997). In the end, German economists who can’t refrain 
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from voicing their opinions will tend to peddle economics that serve Germany’s own self-
interests, just as we’d expect of the British if and when they decide to leave the EU, of the 
Irish when it comes to synchronizing tax rates, or of the US when interest rates are finally 
raised. If it is to succeed, the European project needs to intensify its efforts in those areas 
where national interests are synchronous and leave the difficult bit on the table for future 
generations to resolve.
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The weakness of the academic case for austerity
by David Cobham1
1 Introduction
One of the puzzles of the last few years is that public opinion in many European countries has 
bought the argument that fiscal austerity is somehow necessary and unavoidable, while the 
academic case for it is so weak. This paper provides a short and simple review of the 
(general, rather than specifically German) academic literature on both (the possibility of) 
expansionary fiscal contractions (EFCs) and the relationship between debt ratios and growth 
rates (the related question of the size of the fiscal multiplier is covered briefly in Panicos 
Demetriades’ contribution). 
2 Expansionary fiscal contractions
An early contribution on EFCs is that of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). They contrasted a 
standard Keynesian view of the effects of fiscal consolidation with what they called the 
‘German view’, though it should be said that that view has been taken forward in the 
subsequent academic literature mainly by Italian economists, notably Alberto Alesina, and it 
is not clear how important this literature is to the ‘German macro’ ideas discussed elsewhere 
in these papers. In the Keynesian view tax rises and public expenditure cuts must have a 
direct negative effect on aggregate demand and hence, via the multiplier, on income. But in 
the German view fiscal consolidation could also have indirect positive effects on expectations 
which would lead to increases in investment that would generate increases in output and 
income. This argument can be reinforced by appeal to ‘Ricardian Equivalence’, whereby 
consumers understand that tax rises will be followed in due course by tax cuts so that they do 
not reduce their consumption in response to the tax rises, and this eliminates the direct part of 
the fall in aggregate demand; to the proposition that cuts in public expenditure will free up 
resources for private economic activity which is supposedly more productive; and to an IS-
LM-based argument that fiscal contraction will lead to falls in interest rates which ‘crowd in’ 
1 Heriot-Watt University.
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investment in a way that partly offsets the immediate negative effect on income of fiscal 
consolidation.
It is widely recognised that the conditions required for Ricardian Equivalence to hold are 
unlikely to be satisfied, particularly in the midst of a severe recession: consumers need to be 
far-sighted and to be concerned about their legacies to the next generation, and they need to 
have perfect access to capital markets (so that they can dissave during the tax rise and repay 
when the taxes are cut again). But the long-term existence of unemployment benefit schemes 
in most industrialised countries and the widespread emergence of food banks in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis surely demonstrate not just that those conditions are not fulfilled, but 
that society in general does not believe they are fulfilled.
However, much of the work on EFCs has revolved around empirical evidence: Giavazzi and 
Pagano had studied two particular cases of alleged EFC, and a series of papers by Alesina 
(e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010, 2013) took this much 
further. While the initial focus of these papers was on the finding that expenditure-cut-based 
fiscal consolidations were less damaging and/or more beneficial than tax-rise-based 
consolidations, the emphasis soon switched to the claim that in many cases expenditure-cut-
based fiscal contractions had been followed by expansions in output and income, and also by 
successful and lasting reductions in fiscal deficits. This work, as Islam and Chowdhury (n.d.) 
have pointed out, came to be highly influential in European policymaking circles, even 
though the expansionary and deficit-improving findings typically held for less than half of the 
cases considered; and other research came to question even those findings.
The crucial issue in the empirical debate is that, because tax revenues tend to rise when 
income rises and fall when income falls, while social security benefits tend to be higher in 
recessions and lower in booms, it is difficult to separate the effect of the economy on the 
budget from the effect of the budget on the economy. For example, if the deficit data that are
used contain cyclical effects then some cases of large falls in the deficit will be cases where 
the deficit is falling partly because the economy is expanding: these cases will not be ones 
where sharp budget cuts contributed to good growth, rather the opposite. Alesina and his co-
authors typically made rather simple cyclical adjustments, based on movements in 
unemployment rates, in their identification of the sharp fiscal contractions they went on to 
examine. But there is a widespread suspicion that the resultant series of tax revenues and 
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expenditures still show significant cyclical effects.2 The IMF’s (2010) mea culpa offered an 
alternative identification of such contractions which used published government statements 
and plans to pinpoint deliberate government actions designed to reduce the deficit, as set out 
in more detail in Guajardo et al (2011). With this dataset these authors found unequivocally 
that fiscal contractions were indeed contractionary rather than expansionary. Their 
methodology was endorsed by Perotti (2011) in his retraction of the views set out in, or at 
least attributed to, his (1995) paper with Alesina. Perotti (2011) also re-examined four of the 
episodes of alleged EFC, argued that the discretionary consolidations (and the share of public 
expenditure cuts within them) were smaller than Alesina and Perotti (1995) had thought, and 
emphasised the crucial role played in these cases by changes in exchange rates or interest 
rates or wage growth which were caused by or associated with the fiscal consolidations. As 
he points out, such changes are not likely in the context of fiscal consolidations within the 
Eurozone – and the required interest rate changes cannot occur when interest rates are already 
at their effective lower bound.
Jorda and Taylor (2013; see also Taylor, 2013) provide a striking review and extension of 
these debates. They first use the change in the cyclically adjusted primary deficit, the variable 
used by Alesina and his colleagues. Overall, they are able to replicate the result that fiscal 
contractions are expansionary, but when they distinguish between consolidations occurring 
when the economy is in a boom (positive output gap) and those occurring when the economy 
is in a slump (negative output gap), they find that the expansionary finding applies only in the 
former cases; in the latter cases the fiscal multiplier (the effect on GDP of a deficit reduction) 
is negative but insignificant. On the other hand when they use the IMF/Guajardo et al dataset 
to identify fiscal consolidations they find that the fiscal multiplier is significantly negative in 
slumps and positive but insignificant in booms. They then present evidence that even the IMF 
dataset is not completely purged of cyclical effects. This leads them to employ more 
sophisticated two-stage econometric techniques to get closer to a genuinely randomised 
experiment, and here they find that fiscal contractions are contractionary in both booms and 
slumps, but considerably more so in slumps. Finally, they use their estimates to undertake a 
counterfactual simulation for the UK, to see how differently output would have grown in the 
absence of austerity: the answer is that 3 percentage points of the 5.2 points gap between the 
2 The question of cyclical adjustment is taken even further in work by Darby and Melitz (2008), who show that 
elements of government expenditure other than social security payments  show systematic cyclical variations. 
Their insights have not been incorporated into this debate.
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Office for Budget Responsibility’s 2010 forecast of GDP in 2013 and the outturn for that year 
were due to the austerity measures.  Alesina et al (2015) have focused on the austerity 
measures introduced in various countries since the crisis, using a new dataset and some new 
methods; their results suggest that the measures did indeed contribute to the output 
fluctuations countries experienced and confirm their previous findings that expenditure cuts 
are less damaging to output than tax rises, but they offer no statement about the optimality of 
the austerity measures introduced. As discussant of this paper, Taylor (2015, p431) argued 
that the evidence produced by the authors implied they had now come into line with the 
emerging consensus that the case for expansionary austerity is “effectively over”, although 
they had not said so in as many words.
3 Debt ratios and growth rates
A second strand of the pro-austerity argument is due to Reinhart and Rogoff (R&R, 2010, 
2012), who raised the question of whether there is a threshold to the government debt/GDP 
ratio such that beyond that threshold growth deteriorates significantly: if such a threshold 
exists governments would be justified in taking strong action to avoid hitting the threshold. 
Using a new dataset on government debt and considering ratios in the bands 0-30%, 30-60%, 
60-90% and over 90%, Reinhart and Rogoff identified the growth rate for each advanced 
country in the year for which its debt ratio fell in each band. When they put their results 
together they found that when the government debt/GDP ratio exceeds 90% the economic 
growth rate is sharply lower. This finding was seized on by politicians seeking to defend 
austerity policies, such as the UK finance minister George Osborne and the European 
Commissioner Olli Rehn. 
However, Herndon et al (2011) found a number of errors in the R&R spreadsheet. First, R&R 
omit Australia for the years 1946-9, New Zealand for 1946-9, and Canada for 1946-50. The 
New Zealand exclusion is particularly important because those years were all years of over 
90% debt, with growth of 7.7, 11.9, -9.9 and 10.8%, i.e. an average over the four years of 
5.1%. Secondly, the R&R spreadsheet which Herndon et al accessed had a ‘coding error’: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada and Denmark (i.e. the first five countries of the alphabet) 
were omitted from the averages. Thirdly, the R&R method uses a rather odd weighting: R&R 
assign each country in each year to one of their four debt ratio categories, then average for 
each country the growth in each year for each category, then weight those averages equally 
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when they combine different countries: for example, the UK had an average of 2.4% growth 
over 19 years when in the >90% category, while the US had -2.0% growth for its four years 
in the same category, but those two numbers are weighted equally. In addition, these errors 
interact to make the results ‘stronger’ in R&R’s direction. When the growth data are 
corrected by Herndon et al in line with the above, then the growth for the four bands is 4.2, 
3.1, 3.2, and 2.2%, which contrasts with R&R’s 4.1, 2.9, 3.4, and 0.1%: there is still some 
slowdown as the debt ratio rises but there is no sharp falling off a cliff of the kind R&R 
found. Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2013) reply to Herndon et al. essentially accepts that they have 
identified serious errors, but insists that the basic finding, that growth is typically lower when 
debt ratios are higher, still holds even if the deterioration is now gradual rather than dramatic.
Further light is thrown on these issues by Pescatori et al (2013) who use another new dataset 
but provide a more comprehensive perspective. First, they consider growth over time 
horizons of one, five, ten and fifteen years in order to minimise the reverse causality effects 
from growth on the debt/GDP ratios (higher/lower growth of GDP tending to lower/raise the 
ratio, when what we want to analyse is the effect of the ratio on the growth rate). Secondly, 
they consider a finer set of debt ratio thresholds – 10, 20, 30…140% - rather than the four 
bands considered by R&R. Thus they identify episodes where a country’s debt goes above 
each threshold, and look at the growth rate over each of their time horizons. A country can 
have multiple but not overlapping episodes, so each country has a relatively small number of 
episodes. These episodes are then pooled together and weighted equally when computing the 
averages. Their result for the one year time horizon is broadly consistent with R&R: growth 
is much lower, in fact negative, in the year after the debt ratio hits 90%; but their results for 
longer horizons are very different: growth tends to decline for the 5-year time-horizon, but 
only very slightly for the 10- and 15-year horizons, and in all cases remains positive. They 
also differentiate between when debt ratios are rising and when they are falling: growth turns 
out to be much better when the ratio is falling than when it is rising. They are therefore able 
to conclude that there is no simple debt ratio beyond which a country’s medium-term 
prospects deteriorate sharply.3
However, this issue also needs to be placed within a wider perspective. If we ask what are the
determinants of economic growth, any economist will offer a range of factors which may 
3 However, they argue, this does not mean that debt ratios do not matter: higher debt ratios are typically 
associated, for example, with greater GDP volatility, which is also undesirable.
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even not include the government debt/GDP ratio. Moreover, much of the data that generates 
the threshold finding clearly reflects particular historical developments. For example, the 
fast-growing European countries in the 1950s and 1960s were growing fast because their 
economies had suffered so severely during and immediately after the Second World War 
(from military activity and from punitive confiscations by the victors) and they were catching 
up again. They also had low debt ratios because of high inflation in the immediate aftermath 
of the war. On the other hand, countries like the UK had much higher debt ratios, because of 
war finance that had not been much reduced in value by inflation, and did not have the same 
distance to catch up because their economies had suffered less. Considerations like this 
suggest that the simple question raised by R&R was too simple to be genuinely fruitful, even 
without spreadsheet errors.
4 Conclusion
What comes out of all this is that the academic case for austerity is weak. The evidence does 
not show clearly that fiscal contractions result in economic expansion, and there are good 
reasons both analytical and empirical to the contrary. The evidence that higher debt/GDP 
ratios lead to substantial declines in growth is also unconvincing. In that case there is a 
serious question as to why politicians have often insisted on austerity – a question for another 
day, perhaps – but the immediate conclusion is that the fiscal austerity imposed in so many 
countries has no serious intellectual justification.
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German macroeconomics: channels of influence
By Panicos O. Demetriades1
1 The fiscal policy channel and political mechanisms
Although ‘German macroeconomics’ may or may not exist as a school of thought in
economics, the term itself, rightly or wrongly, has come to be synonymous with fiscal
austerity and, more generally, neglect of the role of aggregate demand in the macroeconomy.
Such views are certainly not confined to Germany. In all likelihood they have emanated
elsewhere, since they can easily be rationalised within the context of the New Classical
school. They have, however, certainly been embraced by German policy makers since 2005
when Angela Merkel became the Chancellor of Germany. This matters because German
policy makers have been able to ‘export’ them to the rest of the European Union and
especially so to the euro area. Euro area programme countries, namely Portugal, Ireland,
Greece and Cyprus have had to adhere to strict austerity policies as part of their economic
adjustment programmes, which were intended to address economic and banking sector
imbalances. The Eurogroup - the ‘informal’ meeting of euro area finance ministers - has been
particularly instrumental in imposing these policies, as it has overseen the design and
implementation of these programmes. Compliance was regularly monitored by teams of
technical experts from the European Commission, the ECB, and the IMF who report to the
Euro Working Group, a technical committee that makes recommendations to the Eurogroup.
Loan instalments to the recipient country were only released when positive assessments were
made by technical experts. Programme implementation was particularly problematic in the
case of Greece, which led to many delays and much uncertainty that escalated to frequent
open discussions of the possibility of Greece exiting the euro area (‘Grexit’).
While fiscal consolidation was necessary to address fiscal imbalances, it is now clear that
austerity may have gone too far, particularly in the case of Greece, in effect by relying - often
implicitly - on underestimates of the fiscal multiplier. Typically, proponents of austerity had
assumed values of the multiplier that are less than unity, drawing on studies of increases in
1 Professor of Financial Economics, University of Leicester. Formerly: Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus 
and member of the ECB Governing Council (3 May 2012-10 April 2014).  The views expressed in this article 
are personal.
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defence spending in the United States (e.g. Barro and Redlick, 2010). Assuming the
multiplier is less than 1 allows cuts to government spending to be more draconian, as the
effects of such cuts in GDP are mitigated by increases in private spending. The reality has, of
course, been rather different, which seems to have surprised the IMF2 and other advocates of
austerity but hasn't surprised Keynesian economists who have long argued that the value of
the multiplier can be especially large during recessions.3 In the case of Greece, the IMF’s
own forecasts which were based on low values of the multiplier were responsible for
successive rounds of austerity. With GDP falling much faster than the expenditure cuts, GDP
and fiscal deficit targets were regularly missed, as tax revenues are dependent on economic
activity. Even more tragically, unemployment kept rising to socially unsustainable levels
whilst the public debt ratio showed no sign of declining. The never ending vicious cycle of
austerity, causing greater and greater pain with no sight of correcting the problem it is meant
to address, has brought austerity policies into disrepute, if not to an end. Proponents of
austerity have often emphasised the need for structural reforms focusing on the supply side to
restore economic growth.
Programme countries and their experiences, as well as the political mechanisms through
which austerity was ‘exported’, are a good example of why German macroeconomics
matters. They are not, however, the only one. Another political mechanism that has helped to
shape the landscape of fiscal policy in the European Union in the style dictated by German
macroeconomics has been the European Popular Party (EPP), which has the largest
representation in the European Parliament. German Christian Democrats play a central role in
the EPP and are able through the EPP to have a major influence on decisions at ECOFIN - the
EU finance minister’s meetings - and at EU Council meetings. It is no coincidence that EPP
leaders’ meetings usually precede EU Council meetings.4 Germany is certainly not on its
own in the EU and that is why it is able to influence economic policy at EU level much more
effectively than perhaps any other country. The EPP is of course not the only channel through
which German macroeconomics is exported. Bilateral channels have also traditionally been
very important, particularly the alliance with France, although the relationship between the
2 See, for example, Blanchard and Leigh (2013).
3 A recent empirical study that finds a value of the multiplier that is substantially higher than unity is Acconcia,
Corsetti and Simonelli (2014).
4 This can also explain the UK’s inability to influence economic policy at EU level (the Conservative party is
not part of the EPP).
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two countries has been strained more recently over disagreements about the stance towards
fiscal policy.
2 Monetary policy
A second and equally important channel of influence of German macroeconomics on
economic policy, albeit a less transparent one, is monetary policy in the euro area. Monetary
policy in the euro area is, of course in the hands of the ECB, which is an independent
institution in which Germany has little, if any, direct say. This is because the Governing
Council of the ECB comprises the governors of 19 euro area countries’ central banks and the
six members of the ECB’s executive board, all of whom act in an individual capacity and not
as representatives of any given country. Moreover, there are only two German voices on the
ECB’s Governing Council: in addition to the Bundesbank president, one member of the
executive board has traditionally been selected by the German government. The influence of
German macroeconomics on the ECB’s Governing Council should thus be expected to be
minimal. In reality, however, German macroeconomics has a disproportionate influence on
monetary policy in the euro area for the following reasons:
(i) The two German voices on the ECB tend to reflect the views of the German
macroeconomics school of thought, even if acting in an individual capacity, since they are
both selected by the German government and are subject to the daily scrutiny of German
public opinion. Moreover, the Bundesbank President reports to the Board of the Bundesbank
and is accountable to the German Parliament; although this is not meant to be on matters
relating to monetary policy, what is and what is not monetary policy is not always very clear.
For example, when the ECB introduced the OMT programme in 2012 to address the risk of a
euro break up, various parties in Germany launched a constitutional challenge against the
ECB, claiming that the OMT was outside its mandate, that it contravened the prohibition of
monetary financing and that the involvement of the Bundesbank breached the German
constitution.
(ii) The German macroeconomics school of thought and its views are quite popular in
other countries in the euro area (e.g. Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovakia). As
such, they are likely to resonate well with several other members of the Governing Council.
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(iii) The ECB is located in Frankfurt, the financial hub of Germany. As such, it is, in some
sense, ‘surrounded’, if not altogether ‘infiltrated’ (for example through staff recruitment), by
German macroeconomic views. A related, if not altogether separate, reason is that the
German media have a keen interest in the ECB and are always keen to spot what they see as
the softer stance of the ECB as compared to the Bundesbank’s hardline views, which are
highly respected.
(iv) The occasional open dissent by the German members of the Governing Council on
monetary policy decisions, which has brought disagreement into the open, has helped to
generate further suspicion of the ECB from within Germany. Such public discord undermines
the effectiveness of monetary policy by raising questions over the commitment of the
Governing Council to medium term issues, such as the commitment to non-standard
measures and the credibility of its forward guidance, making the task of the ECB’s President
at the monthly press briefings even more difficult.5 Given the challenges this entails, the
ECB’s executive board and the President are known to work hard to accommodate the views
of the Bundesbank’s President in order to reach consensus, or at least to prevent frequent
public dissent.
Evidence on whether German macroeconomics is having a disproportionate influence on the
ECB’s monetary policy can be obtained by close examination of the ECB’s record on
meeting its inflation target of 2%. The average inflation rate since the introduction of the euro
has been 1.8%, which is consistent with the objective of maintaining price stability,
interpreted by the ECB as an inflation rate that is below but close to 2%. However, the
average inflation rate of 1.8% masks considerable variation over time, which is depicted in
Figure 1. Specifically, at the time of writing [2 February 2016] the inflation rate has been
less than 1.0% since October 2013, which represents a period of 25 months. By contrast, the
longest period for which the inflation rate was above 3.0% was November 2007-October
2008, i.e. twelve months. An uncomfortable asymmetry has, therefore, emerged which
suggests that the ECB is less comfortable with significant upward deviations from the
inflation target than with downward ones.
5 See, for example, a recent article in the Financial Times (24 January 2016) by Wolfgang Munchau, “Mario
Draghi’s inflation targets miss the mark”, which argues that the ECB keeps failing because it is not fully
committed to the inflation target.
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Figure 1. Inflation rates in the euro area
It is highly unlikely that the ECB would have been equally comfortable or uncomfortable
with inflation rates exceeding 3.0% for such an extended period. Such an asymmetry
indicates that monetary policy in the euro area may have been unduly tight, which is
consistent with the view that German macroeconomics, given its relative neglect of aggregate
demand factors, may be having a disproportionate influence on monetary policy. It also
suggests that the ECB should have acted earlier not only in reducing interest rates but also in
introducing its asset purchase programme (QE), which has been the source of considerable
public dissent from German members of the Governing Council since its inception. Although
the programme was in the end introduced, the ‘wait and see’ stance adopted by the ECB on
both standard and non-standard policy measures may reflect an understandable desire to
achieve consensus, which, ultimately, provides the dissenting minority with a
disproportionate influence on monetary policy.
3 Concluding remarks
German macroeconomics matters not just for Germany but for the entire euro area and also
for the rest of the EU. This article has explained the channels and mechanisms through which
it has had a disproportionate effect on both fiscal policy in the EU and monetary policy in the
euro area. While German policy makers may be proud that they have been successful in
Euro area (changing composition) - HICP - Overall index, Annual rate of change, Eurostat, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted
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exporting their policy preferences to their partners in the rest of Europe, they need to also
consider the possibility that the true model may be different from what they believe. If indeed
the true model of the economy is one in which aggregate demand plays a greater role than is
afforded by German macroeconomics, their success may have deleterious longer-term
consequences. The SYRIZA government in Greece, elected on the back of anti-austerity
sentiment in January 2015, is a good example of this. Its election nearly led to the break-up of
the euro when negotiations between Greece and its creditors came close to collapsing in the
summer of 2015. The risks are possibly even greater when it comes to the influence of
German macroeconomic views on monetary policy. As the ECB’s ability to demonstrate its
commitment to price stability and to protect the singleness of monetary policy is increasingly
coming under question, deflation risk and financial fragility in the euro area can easily
resurface and so can the risks of the euro unraveling.6 History has taught us that unnecessarily
tight monetary policy can have as devastating consequences as excessively easy monetary
policy. In a monetary union without 100% political commitment to its irrevocability, any
such errors can prove lethal.
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Is German (macro-) economic policy different?
by Lars P. Feld1
Some observers in the Anglo-Saxon world wonder why German economic policy, in 
particular regarding solutions for the Eurocrisis, strongly emphasizes structural reforms and 
improvement of competitiveness instead of demand management and debt relief. Is there a 
difference between German macroeconomics and the rest of the world? Does the particularly 
German, ordoliberal school of economics play a role in Germany’s policy? Or is it its own 
historical experience, perhaps even pure political preferences, that shape this position? For 
some commentators, German ordoliberalism has to be accused as the main suspect leading to 
“the wacky economics of Germany’s parallel universe” (Wolfgang Munchau, FT, 17 
November 2014).2 In this paper, I will argue that there is nothing special about German 
macroeconomics or its economic policy, but that it follows basic political preferences, not 
heavily depending on the parties in power at the federal level. However, German emphasis of 
rules as guiding principles of economic policy has to do with German ordoliberalism.
Before outlining this argument, a caveat is in place. The following discussion focuses on 
economic policy. There is no argument in this paper as to whether German economists as part 
of European economics are competitive as compared to their American colleagues. A long-
ranging academic debate has provided empirical evidence on the American domination 
among eminent economists, the reasons for it, but also a reduction of U.S. economists’ 
dominance across time (Frey and Pommerehne 1988, Frey and Eichenberger 1993, Kocher 
and Sutter 2001, Frey and Rost 2010, Haucap and Muck 2015). Meanwhile, journal 
publications of German, Swiss or Austrian economists, e.g., in the fields of experimental 
economics or public economics, show that there is no longer much difference. 
Moreover, it should be noted that there is no German economics as such. A look at the 
distribution of the research activities of German-speaking economists quickly reveals how 
diverse their interests and views are. This also holds with respect to macroeconomics. As 
1 Prof. Dr. Lars P. Feld is Professor of Economic Policy at the University of Freiburg, Director of the Walter
Eucken Institute and Member of the German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE).
2 See also the following contributions from The Economist: ‘Slow, but popular’ (8 December 2012),
‘Ordoliberalism revisited’ (18 October 2014), ‘The sputtering engine’ (22 November 2014) and ‘Of rules and
order’ (9 May 2015, Vol. 415, No. 8937, pp. 21-22).
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generally observed, the New Keynesian paradigm dominates the research of German macro-
and monetary economists. However, as the views of Stanford University’s John Taylor and 
New York Times columnist Paul Krugman diverge, so do the views of Peter Bofinger and 
Volker Wieland, both members of the German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE). Just as 
those American economists have strong views and express them, but also use well-
established methods from positive economics in conducting their research, German 
economists also cross the dividing line between normative and positive economics. 
Thus, the question to be addressed in this paper should be properly stated: Is the dominant 
view in German macroeconomic policy different, and, if so, why is it? When it comes to 
economic policy, the dividing line between positive and normative economics becomes fuzzy 
anyway. To understand current macroeconomic policy positions in Germany, it is necessary 
to provide an overview of the development of economic thinking in German politics since the 
Second World War, beginning with a brief explanation of what ordoliberalism is, followed by 
a necessarily personal discussion of the development of German macroeconomic policy 
across time. Finally I will interpret German positions during the Eurocrisis in the light of this 
analysis, taking into account political preferences and historical experiences.   
What Is Ordoliberalism?
At first sight, Ordoliberalism seems to be a purely German particularity, but this is too 
shortsighted. German ordoliberals aimed at distinguishing their liberal economic thinking 
from the classical liberalism of the 19th century. Laissez-faire economic policy should be 
replaced, according to ordoliberal authors like Walter Eucken, Wilhelm Röpke or Alexander 
Rüstow, by a government providing a rules-based (constitutional) framework under which 
market forces could operate, but without intervening in day-to-day economic decisions. Most 
important to Eucken and the Freiburg School of Economics was competition policy.3 Based 
on their analysis of the cartelization and monopolization of the economy during the Weimar 
Republic and the disastrous impact of those processes on economic performance, Eucken 
asked for a rigorous competition policy requiring a state that is strong enough to stand above 
3 For an introduction to the Freiburg School, see Vanberg (2004). The Freiburg School is one branch of German
Ordoliberalism in addition to the conservative Ordoliberalism of Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow as well
as the social Ordoliberalism of Alfred Müller-Armack.
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special interests (Eucken 1952/2004).4 In addition, Eucken’s principles of economics allow 
for a range of government policies correcting market failures or undesired market outcomes. 
Keeping in mind the state of economic thinking at that time, much of his analysis could well 
be embedded into modern welfare economics, but also provides arguments for a welfare 
state. A distinguishing element of Eucken’s thinking, however, is his insistence that 
government policy should be focused on the rules-based framework enabling market forces to 
result in efficient outcomes, provided these outcomes are the result of market competition. 
Essentially, these arguments are not different from the general equilibrium Arrow-Debreu-
model in microeconomics. The rules-based thinking is indeed different and rather related to 
the Old Chicago School of Henry Simons and Frank Knight that similarly influenced the 
public choice and constitutional economics school founded by James Buchanan (Vanberg 
2014).5 Three of Eucken’s principles of economics provide additional support for this 
contention. First, Eucken was convinced that a prudent economic constitution must be based 
on monetary stability (the “primacy of currency policy”). Second, Eucken emphasized the 
liability principle, i.e., those who reap the benefits of their economic conditions must also 
bear the costs and thus the risks of making losses. Third, the constancy of government policy 
completes Eucken’s set of principles of economics. The importance of stable money and the 
liability principle in Eucken’s work may support the claim that German macroeconomic 
policy during the Eurocrisis corresponds to ordoliberal thinking (Weidmann 2014). The 
constancy of government policy rather alludes to time inconsistency problems and thus 
precedes the debates of rules vs. discretion in macroeconomic policy (Kydland and Prescott 
1977, Barro and Gordon 1983). 
Eucken’s views about Keynesian economic thinking are not generally known. This may be 
due to the outbreak of the Second World War after the publication of Keynes’ (1936) General 
Theory, but is perhaps rather the result of Eucken’s early death in 1950, sometime before the 
economic debate in Germany seriously adopted Keynesianism. Again, the contention that 
Eucken would probably be opposed to Keynesian thinking, e.g. because his views appeared 
to be close to Hayek’s or Röpke’s in other respects, may be premature. Eucken supported the 
4 Eucken opted for methodological reasons to take the political process as given (Eucken, 1940/1950, pp. 213-
216), leaving his concept of the state largely unexplained. This has been interpreted to conceal an authoritarian
conviction (Kirchgässner 1988). For a recent evaluation of Eucken’s stance on democracy, countering the
accusation of authoritarianism, see Nientiedt and Köhler (2016).
5 For similarities between research programmes in Chicago and Freiburg in the 1930s, see Köhler and Kolev
(2013), but also see Simons (1934/1948).
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so-called Lautenbach plan, a proposal aimed at preventing a liquidity trap in 1931, thus being 
in opposition to Hayek’s thoughts about policies to overcome the Great Depression. Wilhelm 
Lautenbach was Keynesian before Keynes’ General Theory and proposed expansionary fiscal 
policies to overcome the Great Depression, having these views reflected in the report of the 
Brauns Commission to chancellor Brüning.6 Wilhelm Röpke, who was a member of the 
Brauns Commission and thus supported the proposal of a credit expansion, opposed 
Keynesian policies of full employment later (Röpke 1952). He thus serves as example of an 
ordoliberal opposition to Keynesian thinking, but Eucken does not. 
In the time that remained to him after the Second World War, Eucken indeed had other things 
to do than to grapple with Keynes and his thoughts. Germany was destroyed and divided, it 
had to be rebuilt, and its economy had to be revived. Moreover, the plans of the Allies were 
fluid as the Cold War cast its shadows. In that period after the war Eucken’s principles of 
economic policy directly gained political influence. Eucken was one of the founding 
members of the Scientific Advisory Board to the Administration of Economic Affairs and 
later the German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, and regularly corresponded with 
Ludwig Erhard, from 1948 onwards director of the Administration of Economic Affairs in the 
common economic zone. More importantly, one of Eucken’s students, Leonhard Miksch, 
held a position in Erhard’s administration. Miksch, intensively exchanging views with 
Eucken, drafted the law that liberalized prices together with the currency reform in June 
1948.7
The German ’economic miracle’ after these reforms has been attributed ever since to Ludwig 
Erhard and his ordoliberal advisers, in particular the Freiburg School of Economics. Whether 
this contention holds in this strong version may be contestable. Some influence on German 
economic development after the war must, for example, be attributed to the London debt 
agreement in 1953. Still, the immediate transition from a system of administered prices, 
inherited from the National Socialists, to a market economy together with a new stable 
currency certainly played an important role. All of a sudden, the rationing and shortages
prevailing before Erhard’s reforms were replaced by full windows in the shops. 
6 For the Lautenbach plan, see Lautenbach (1931, 1952), for the Brauns Commission see Röpke (1931).
7 Miksch’s influence on Ludwig Erhard at the ‘Verwaltung für Wirtschaft’ during the spring of 1948 has been 
recently discussed with new archival material (Feld and Köhler 2015). 
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The Development of German Macroeconomic Policy8
While the beginning of economic policy in Germany after the Second World War was 
influenced by ordoliberalism, Keynesianism quickly replaced it in the next two decades. This 
can also be inferred by an analysis of the reports and the protocols of the Scientific Advisory 
Board to the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs. The board initially supported Erhard’s 
ordoliberal reforms, but moved to the adoption of Keynesian ideas during the 1950s and 
1960s. Eucken and Miksch had already passed away in 1950 when the Scientific Advisory 
Board to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and its sister institution, the Scientific Advisory 
Board to the Federal Finance Ministry, in 1956 proposed to pool economic policy advice in a 
German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE).9 Erhard was at first critical of this proposal 
because he feared an emerging influence of Keynesianism or even economic planning. In the 
end, he supported the proposal and the GCEE became founded by law in 1963. 
I mention these three economic advisory institutions prominently because they have brought 
together the dominant economic thinking in Germany, and perhaps also influenced economic 
policy since their foundation. In contrast to other advisory boards or commissions of the 
federal government in Germany (and to most other similar institutions in the world), all three 
economic advisory institutions are independent in several dimensions. It has thus happened 
frequently that they have criticized the economic or fiscal policies of the government. In their 
hybrid construction, they advise the government, but also have influence on economic policy 
through the public and the media. Following their reports and comparing them with actual 
policy reveals interesting patterns of the changing economic paradigms in German economic 
policy.
The GCEE is certainly a child of post-war Keynesian thinking in Germany. The GCEE law 
requires it to analyse the macroeconomic situation in Germany by studying whether price 
stability, external balance and high employment could be achieved with continuous and 
decent economic growth. These different macroeconomic goals were also included in the 
Law to Promote Stability and Growth in 1967. Although Karl Schiller, Minister of Economic 
Affairs and the architect of this Law, viewed his concept as merely supplementing the 
8 In this section, I draw on Feld, Köhler and Nientiedt (2015).
9 For a detailed discussion, see Blesgen’s (2000) biography of Erich Preiser, Professor at the Universities of
Heidelberg from 1947 to 1956 and of Munich from 1956 to 1967, founding member of the Scientific Advisory
Board to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and an early Keynesian. He was key to the foundation of the GCEE.
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Freiburg imperative with Keynesian demand management, modern observers of this policy 
stress the dominance of Keynesianism (Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding 1992, Hagemann 
2000, p. 115). 
In his analysis of German monetary policy after the war, Richter (1999, pp. 19-20) notes that 
monetary policy was also regarded as being part of an overall concept of full employment 
policy. Specifically, the central bank was expected to foster economic growth by keeping 
interest rates low (Richter 1999, pp. 48-50). In line with this approach, the Bundesbank 
employed a measure of bank liquidity to guide its monetary policy decisions. This policy was 
aimed at three goals simultaneously: price stability, high employment and external balance 
(ibid, pp. 55-59). Notably, the German central bank deviated from the goal of price stability 
in order to boost aggregate demand: when confronted with the first recession after the war in 
1967, the bank found it necessary to stabilize the business cycle by monetary measures (ibid, 
p. 65). Moreover, Richter underlines that ordoliberal arguments did not play an important role 
in the monetary policy debates of the late 1940s and 1950s.
In the beginning of the 1970s, Monetarism emerged as a major intellectual force in the 
German discussion of monetary policy (Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding 1992). Following the 
arguments by Milton Friedman and (Swiss economist) Karl Brunner, economists such as 
Hans Monissen and Manfred J.M. Neumann strongly recommended that the expansion (or 
contraction) of the quantity of money should be used as an indicator of monetary policy 
measures (e.g. Neumann 1972). Monetarist theory also maintained that central banks should 
primarily be concerned with price stability (Friedman 1968, pp. 14-17). When Germany had 
to redesign its monetary policy approach after the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, 
the Bundesbank accepted the monetarist prescription and chose monetary targeting as its 
modus operandi (Richter 1999, p. 78). In 1974, the German central bank announced a money 
supply target for the first time − and continued to do so even after a number of central banks 
adopted inflation targeting in the 1990s. Thus, from the mid-seventies onwards, the 
Bundesbank followed a monetary policy rule reflecting the ideas of Friedman.
The German Council of Economic Experts was influential in developing concepts for 
monetary targeting which supported the Bundesbank’s policy change (GCEE 1973). More 
importantly, it induced the paradigm shift in German economic policy from Keynesianism to 
Supply-side Economics. In its annual report in 1976, the GCEE wrote that it is the 
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responsibility of supply-oriented economic policy to improve the conditions for private 
investment and structural change such that decent economic growth and high employment are 
achieved (GCEE 1976, paragraph 296). This was the same year as that when Herbert Stein 
coined the term Supply-side Economics in the U.S., but sometime before it became popular 
under Ronald Reagan. In Germany, the new government of Helmut Kohl in 1982 slowly 
adopted the new concept by the GCEE. 
The coalition between Christian Democrats and Free Democrats came to power after the 
Social-Liberal coalition of Helmut Schmidt broke up, triggered by the so-called Lambsdorff
paper by the then Minister of Economic Affairs, Otto Graf Lambsdorff. The paper demanded
a shift to supply-side policy, in particular reforms of the labour market, the social security 
system, tax reforms and a consolidation of public finances (Feld 2013). The Kohl government 
accomplished the latter two, but did not manage to reform the labour market and social 
security. Interestingly, it was Gerhard Schröder who undertook the reforms partly proposed 
already in the Lambsdorff paper. Schröder’s reforms were informed by another report of the 
GCEE (2002), but preceded by a decentralization of wage setting (Dustmann et al 2014). 
These brief remarks on three decades of economic policy, affected by important economic 
shocks like reunification, the introduction of the Euro or the financial crisis, indicate that the 
discussions about economic policy following from the supply-side oriented concept of the 
GCEE have continued until today. German macroeconomic policy continued to develop 
along international lines, quickly following the rational expectations revolution, but also New 
Keynesian modelling strategies. For example, in a discussion of economic policy in 
Germany, Hellwig and Neumann (1987) argue that fiscal consolidation may lead to non-
Keynesian effects depending on the strength of rational expectations, thus preceding Alesina 
and Perotti (1997) or Alesina and Ardagna (1998) by ten years. Issing and Wieland (2013) 
provide a broader discussion with a focus on monetary economics. There is actually no 
difference between German and Anglo-Saxon macroeconomics. German economic policy 
adopted Keynesianism a bit more slowly than Monetarism or New Classical 
Macroeconomics. This does not, however, hold for New Keynesian macroeconomics, and the 
time lags followed the need for macroeconomic policy: Germany faced its first recession 
after the war in 1967. 
German macro: how it’s different and why that matters
However, ordoliberalism always played a role in the background. Despite the changing 
macroeconomic paradigms, Olaf Sievert, a long-time member and former chairman of the 
GCEE, the architect of German supply-side economics, emphasized that the council has 
always focused on the microeconomic foundations of economic activity as well as on 
ordoliberal − rather than interventionist – policy-making (Sievert 2003, p. 35). Other 
prominent examples of German economists who argue in favour of Ordnungspolitik include 
the members of the Kronberger Kreis,10 the Bundesbank, exemplified by their past presidents 
such as Hans Tietmeyer and their current president Jens Weidmann, as well as Hans-Werner 
Sinn, who reasoned at the height of the financial crisis that the U.S. needed to subject their 
banks to a strong regulatory framework in the ordoliberal tradition (Sinn, 2009).11
German Positions During the Eurocrisis
This tour d’horizon of the adoption of new ideas in macroeconomics by German economists, 
economic policy advisers and politics highlights that German macroeconomics is not 
different from any other and that ordoliberalism played a second order role. Political 
necessities and preferences have shaped particular economic policies in Germany across time. 
Directly after the Second World War, Germany had to be rebuilt and the transition to a 
(social) market economy, informed by ordoliberal thought, was the best way to cope with 
these problems. With the first recession in 1966, Keynesianism had its breakthrough in 
German economic policy. After the fall of the Bretton Woods system, the Bundesbank used 
its newly gained discretion and quickly adopted the concepts of Monetarism. Additionally, 
Germans have had a difficult relationship with the idea of inflation for most of the 20th
century. Paul Samuelson (1961, p. 677) famously remarked that whoever experienced the 
hyperinflation of the Weimar Republic could not discuss a compromise between price 
stability and growth. Thus, the Bundesbank’s strategy also reflected popular opinion. The 
adoption of supply-side economics also followed political necessities, opportunities and 
preferences as would be expected given the results of more than fifty years of research in the 
10 The Kronberger Kreis is a circle of ordoliberal economists and lawyers founded in 1981. I am currently
speaker of this circle.
11 Before he concluded his career as President of the Bundesbank, Hans Tietmeyer worked at the Federal
Ministry of Economic Affairs from 1962 to 1982. From 1982 to 1989, he was Secretary of State in the Federal
Finance Ministry. He drafted the law to establish the GCEE, drafted the so-called Lambsdorff paper, and was
important in the negotiations for German unification and EMU. In 1988, he escaped an assassination attempt by
the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF). Another influential person in the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs was
Otto Schlecht. Both Tietmeyer and Schlecht were strongly influenced by Ordoliberalism when studying
economics.
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fields of public choice, constitutional economics and political economics with its emphasis on 
the self-interest of political decision-makers. The influence of ideas should not be 
exaggerated. 
The same holds with respect to German positions during the Great Recession following the 
financial crisis and followed by the Eurocrisis. During the Great Recession, the German 
government (and the Bundesbank) supported the expansionary monetary policy of the ECB, 
quickly started to rescue the German banking system and adopted expansionary fiscal policy 
measures. The GCEE (2008) and the Scientific Advisory Board to the Federal Finance 
Ministry (2008) advocated such a strategy. As the federal government feared adverse effects 
on its refinancing conditions because of this deficit spending, the latter additionally proposed 
the introduction of the debt brake in order to stabilize expectations of market participants that 
Germany would return to solid public finances. This may have helped Germany to become a 
safe haven during the Eurocrisis. 
The position the German government took in the Eurocrisis to date also follows such 
pragmatism (Feld, Köhler and Nientiedt, 2015). It has accepted the policy of the ECB, 
although it is becoming more and more reluctant to do so. It has taken a prominent role in the 
rescue policy providing funds to Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus, although this 
may have infringed on the no bailout-clause of the European Treaties. It has pushed towards a 
banking union in order to reduce the connection between sovereigns and banks. It has even 
accepted a restructuring of Greek debt, in the beginning of 2012 in the form of private sector 
involvement and in the end of 2012 by facing maturity extension and interest rate reduction 
on its own loans to Greece. The first restructuring amounted to a debt reduction in present-
value terms of about 70 percent, the second to about 50 percent. 
The underlying rationale of EFSF and ESM programmes follows along the lines of IMF 
programmes. Countries that do not have access to finance anymore get fresh money in 
exchange for the promise to conduct reforms of their labour and product markets as well as a 
consolidation of their budgets. There is nothing particularly German or even ordoliberal in it. 
It is simply common practice in international finance. The conditions of such rescue 
programmes are always debated among the participating parties. No creditor wants to lose 
money. It is thus no surprise that the IMF urges Germany to accept another Greek 
restructuring while it does not accept a haircut on its own loans. No debtor country wants to 
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impose too harsh reform measures on its own population which is demonstrating against 
them. Many of the accusations that Germany faces are driven by the strong interests of the 
different players, especially those active in financial markets. Without the willingness of 
public creditors to provide funds to countries in trouble, they would have had to impose real 
austerity. 
Germany’s emphasis on structural reforms and sound public finances does not simply follow 
from ordoliberalism. Of course, the rules-based framework of EMU is open to a 
reinterpretation in ordoliberal thinking (Feld, Köhler and Nientiedt, 2015). Monetary policy is 
centralized, with fiscal and other economic policies on purpose remaining with the national 
authority, but in the hope that national policies are disciplined by the financial markets. The 
Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact, and later the Fiscal Compact, serve as 
devices that help countries to achieve sound fiscal policies and avoid harsh reactions in the 
financial markets. These are all clear ordoliberal principles aiming at a congruence of liability 
and control. However, as the broad discussion about fixed and flexible exchange rates since 
the 1950s shows, a monetary union is only sustainable if there is a minimum degree of 
convergence of the economic policies of its members. If the instrument of exchange rate 
adjustments is no longer available, other mechanisms of adjustment become more important. 
If member states do not want to establish a fiscal transfer system between themselves, wage 
and price flexibility on the one hand and mobility of labour and capital on the other hand 
have to manage the necessary adjustment to economic shocks. Put differently, alternatives to
the current policy in the Eurozone rely on additional finances external to each country in 
trouble. Germany’s position as unwilling to establish policies that lead to such transfer 
systems should be understood as in its own interest. If any other country were willing to step 
in and pay, be it the US, Britain or France, it is not a bold hypothesis that Germany would be 
happy to accept that. 
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Versailles in Athens: The implications of German government policy for 
Greece 
by Brigitte Granville1
1 Collective Memory 
In Granville, Martorell Cruz and Prevezer (2015) we focus on the way that history and 
culture interact (Boldizzoni, 2011; Douglas, 1986 and Temin, 1997) to form a collective 
memory or a ‘shared mental model’ comprising a set of prior assumptions and 
categorizations used by people in making choices (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Drawing 
on the social psychology literature, decision-making is explained not by rationality but by 
individuals and groups being conditioned by a country’s shared mental model (Denzau and 
North, 1994; Mantzavinos, North and Shariq, 2004). 
Although this concept of ‘shared mental model’ could quickly degenerate into national 
stereotypes, the cognitive process lying at the foundation of the social order cannot be 
explained by rational choice theory, as Mary Douglas (1986) argued. In this short essay, the 
historical event which is the most widely identified as being part of the collective German 
memory and at the roots of German policy towards the Greek and wider Eurozone (EZ) crisis 
is the country’s inter-war experience of hyperinflation and the destruction of democracy 
(Ferguson and Granville, 2000). The lesson drawn from those calamities was that a strong 
state was needed to create the framework for the economy to function through rules and laws 
(Bonefeld, 2012). 
Collective memory and economic patterns 
The rules-based tenets of Ordoliberalism leave open the question of the actual content of the 
rules concerned: this question was answered in practice by the nature of Germany’s growth 
model. For reasons that may be traced back partly to the Weimar experience and partly to the 
post-war reconstruction period, Germany committed itself to balancing the government 
1Queen Mary University of London, Center for Globalization Research.
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budget and using interest rates to fight inflation. The social security and cohesion that came 
from high levels of employment and reliable wages was achieved at the cost of a long-term 
bias against domestic demand and a reliance on external demand. Streeck (2010) argues that 
in addition to Ordoliberalism collective memory is influenced by a Durkheimian concept of 
the state which led in the post-war reconstruction period to the idea of social obligations. This 
Durkheimian spirit of collective public and national interest which infused the economic 
policies accompanying reunification in 1990 gave rise to fiscal pressures and loss of 
competitiveness that were then corrected by a striving to return to the ‘Order’ – only now, 
according to Streek (2010), in the Williamson (1985) framework of increased efficiency 
associated with the Hartz reforms under the Schroder government in 2001-02. 
For Streeck (2010), this Williamsonian framework was developed during the 1980s, under 
pressure of the liberalization of capital markets. The hold of the Durkheimian ideas of 
solidaristic social obligations gave way to a more segmented approach, where coordination 
and cooperative alliances on a company basis between employers and workforce are pursued 
for the sake of mutual efficiency gains for those in the core economy, at the cost of what 
Streeck calls disorganization in the fringe sectors. These Williamsonian ideas of the state’s 
role bear some comparison with the earlier ideas of Ordoliberalism, but there is less emphasis 
in Williamson (1985) on order and more on contractual individual advantage. 
Those Hartz reforms nevertheless maintained the German tradition of demand repression –
and, as it happened, they coincided with the launch of the euro. Thus it was that the core 
conceptual error of the single currency was gravely aggravated. This error may be labelled 
‘mythical convergence’. 
2 Mythical convergence2
The motivations of the founders of the economic and monetary union (EMU) – France and 
Germany – was the quest for stability (James, 2012) in the spirit of “the discipline and 
certainty of the gold standard” (Bordo and James, 2013: 1) to ensure the smooth functioning 
of the common market. By fixing the nominal exchange rate and therefore eliminating 
exchange risk, convergence between the stronger and weaker economies that share the euro –
2 This section draws on Granville and Nagly (2014 and 2015).
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the so called ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ – would be achieved through the smooth flow of capital 
from the surplus to the deficit countries loosening the latter’s external constraint and 
improving their output capacities and productivity (James, 2012). 
The very opposite has turned out to be the case. The early literature (Thirlwall, 1991; 
Feldstein, 1992; Godley, 1992; Gourinchas, 2002), warned that balance of payments 
problems within the monetary union – far from disappearing – would steadily deepen in the 
event of economic divergence between EZ members, especially diverging levels of 
competitiveness (proxied by unit labour costs). Indeed, divergence in trade and 
competitiveness performance has been exacerbated by real effective exchange rate (REER) 
appreciation, largely driven by nominal appreciation of the common currency post-1999 
(Chen, Milesi-Ferretti and Tressel, 2012). 
Without the ‘safety valve’ of external devaluation, divergent competitiveness is addressed in 
two ways: internal devaluation that is “a depreciation of the real exchange rate in the deficit 
countries via a cut in their unit labour costs, either through higher productivity or lower 
nominal wages” (Belke and Dreger, 2013:14) or cross-border financial flows – that is, 
transfers.
As already mentioned, however, pre-existing ULC divergence was aggravated by Germany’s 
Hartz reforms at the very onset of the euro. Germany engaged in a new wave of internal 
devaluation, by depressing its real wage growth in order to enhance its price competitiveness 
(Cesaratto and Stirati 2010). Table 1 shows the deepening of the divergence of 
competitiveness measured by unit labour costs (ULC) with Germany. 
TABLE 1 - UNIT LABOUR COST, PERCENT CHANGE BETWEEN Q3 1999 AND Q4 2008
France Germany Greece Italy Portugal
ULC 5.2 -15.94 19.79 12.54 10.03
relative to 
Germany 21.14 0 35.73 28.48 25.98
Note: Competitiveness indicator: relative unit labour costs, overall economy. Index: 
2005=100, seasonally adjusted.
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Source: Authors’ calculation in Granville and Nagly (2014) on data from OECD Economic 
Outlook
When, after the 2008 global financial crisis, this divergence could no longer be papered over 
by private sector transfers and the public sector had to step in to rescue Greece and the other 
countries that had lost market access, Germany presided over what has become a rules-based 
transfer union – that is, in accordance with the ‘no bail-out’ principles of the monetary union, 
official transfers are made conditional on fiscal tightening designed to ensure compliance 
with the rules laid down in the relevant treaties from Maastricht to the Fiscal Compact which 
entered in force in January 2013.
In this way, Greece and the other troubled countries of the EZ periphery were dragged into 
the inferno of internal devaluation with small competitiveness gains and dramatic 
consequences in terms of output losses and unemployment (Bagnai, 2015; Papanikos, 2015). 
Greece experienced a depression comparable to the decline in output and employment that 
Germany suffered from 1930 to 1932. 
The way out of this spiral lies in a fiscally-led demand expansion in Germany. And, as it 
happens, such an expansion is called for by the rules of the Eurozone – specifically, the EU’s 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP).
3 The rebalancing mechanism is jammed
In a rules-based monetary union, the adjustment mechanism of nominal exchange rate 
realignments has to be replaced by the implementation of rules in a fair and symmetrical 
manner. But the rules-based monetary union stopped at the core. The situation may be 
compared to a club, whose initial rules were set according to the collective memory and 
economic structure of the club’s core member, Germany. Many of the club’s rules are 
consequently stacked against the weakest members – that is, the countries caught in the cycle 
of inferior competitiveness. Two examples illustrate how the rebalancing mechanism is 
jammed.
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Germany’s macroeconomic imbalances
The relevant rule is the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. The MIP states that the 
European Commission should launch infringement proceedings against countries that run:
“3 year average of the current account balance as a percentage of GDP, with indicative 
thresholds of +6% and - 4%.” (European Commission, 2014). 
In other words, the rules should apply to Germany too where according to the European 
Commission (2015: 14):
“The current account surplus increased from 6.7 % of GDP in 2013 to 7.4 % in 2014, well 
above the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure indicative three-year threshold of 6 % of 
GDP.”
Since 2004, that is for 11 years, Germany has had an average current account surplus of 6 per 
cent of GDP (IMF, 2015: 11). The surplus not only makes it harder for the Eurozone crisis 
countries to claw their way out of trouble; it is not in Germany’s own economic interest. The 
surpluses are being recycled into capital flows abroad with a negative rate of return, eroding 
the wealth base that the country will need over the next ten years as it goes into precipitous 
demographic decline. Germany’s jobless rate fell in 2015 to a post-reunification low of 4.7%. 
The country should therefore be enjoying a surge of consumption. But the German finance 
ministry is instead running a budget surplus of 0.6% of GDP.
If the rules were applied symmetrically to both core and periphery members of the Eurozone, 
under the MIP, an excessive imbalance procedure would be launched whereby Germany 
could be ordered to present an ‘action plan’ to cut the surplus. If that failed, Berlin could be 
forced to pay a deposit of up to 0.1% of GDP into a special account, while it is on probation. 
Ultimately, this money can be seized if nothing is done.
Greece’s liquidity crisis
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The perfect example as regards Greece is the European Central Bank (ECB)’s emergency 
liquidity assistance (ELA) facility, which the Greek banks were forced to tap through the 
Greek central bank from February 2015 onwards, when the ECB decided to stop accepting 
Greek banks’ collateral. The rules governing the ELA facility state that:
“responsibility for the provision of ELA lies with the NCB [national central bank] concerned. 
This means that any costs of, and the risks arising from, the provision of ELA are incurred by 
the NCB . . .” (ECB, 2014)
and therefore not shared according to the NCBs’ capital keys in the ECB. Yet, while the NCB 
must take the lending risk of ELA, the final say lies with the ECB:
“Article 14.4 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European 
Central Bank (Statute of the ECB) assigns the Governing council of the ECB responsibility 
for restricting ELA operations if it considers that these operations interfere with the 
objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem. Such decisions are taken by the Governing Council 
with a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast.”
As a result, the ECB was able to bring about a partial shut-down of the Greek banking system 
at the peak of the crisis in July-August 2015. 
4 Conclusion
In areas where the rules might be applied in a way that runs counter to the policy preferences 
of the German elite – as in the case of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure – those rules 
are not applied. The reason for this is that the paramount political priority is to hold the 
Eurozone together, and this means working within the limits of the politically possible in 
Germany.
One obvious way out of this situation would be for one or more of the economically 
depressed Eurozone countries to say that they no longer wish to remain in this rules-based 
club whose rules are selectively applied. In other words, they wish to opt out. 
The prospect of the Eurozone breaking up has economic and financial dimensions. On the 
one hand, if a club member decides to leave the club because he cannot abide by the rules, 
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that decision should be perfectly acceptable to the ordoliberal mind. On the other hand, the 
consequences of a Eurozone break-up might jeopardise the price stability priority of German 
Ordoliberalism. 
The reason for this is that ECB refinancing facilities have made the deficit EZ members 
dependent on central bank money. These credits as stressed by Buiter et al (2011) are 
extended without clear technical assessment of central bank equity and collateral. Thus if 
Greece (and/or other troubled EZ countries) were to leave the monetary union, the collateral 
used for Target2 and ELA would be depreciated upon conversion into reinstated local 
currencies. The European System of Central Banks would therefore see its equity reduced, if 
not wiped out. Since neither the ECB nor the NCBs are required to hold positive equity, a 
Greek exit does not imply recapitalizing the ECB. The decision on how to react to any such 
equity loss would depend on whether the ECB was principally concerned with its own 
solvency on paper, or whether it continued to stick to its operational mandate, as examined by 
Buiter and Rahbari (2012: 45). If the ECB decided to correct a negative net worth position on 
its balance sheet by recapitalizing itself, this could be inflationary. 
Germany would thus be faced with the unappetizing choice of tolerating a formally insolvent 
central bank or inflationary recapitalization of the central bank and probably also several 
commercial banks. It may be for this economic reason that the July 2015 Schäuble Grexit 
proposal was overruled by Chancellor Merkel or was never serious in the first place but 
designed rather to deter major Eurozone members in economic difficulty such as France and 
Italy from pressuring Germany to accept a different kind of Eurozone by implying that 
Germany would be relaxed about the alternative of a Eurozone break-up – when, in reality, 
Germany would be far from relaxed.
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The social context for German economists: Public attitudes towards 
macroeconomic policy in Germany
by Bernd Hayo and Florian Neumeier1
1 Introduction
German economists appear to give macroeconomic policy advice that is different from that 
offered by economists in other countries such as France or the United Kingdom. For example, 
casual observation suggests that many German economists are relatively more critical of 
monetary policies that have the potential to endanger price stability and relatively more 
favourably disposed toward ‘austerity’-based fiscal policy. Why is this the case? Perhaps it is 
due to a different reading of economic theory and empirical evidence in Germany’s academic 
institutions. Or, in other words, maybe the difference between German economists and their 
counterparts in other countries is due to purely rational differences in training and education. 
This is an interesting line of thought, but not the one we pursue in this paper. 
Instead, we explain the positions taken by German economists based on a broader social 
science perspective. Our starting point is that economists are part of the society in which they 
live and work. We argue that their mode of thinking about and perception of economics is 
influenced by how they were socialised as well as by their everyday social environment. 
Most personal experience occurs in structured social contexts, leading sociological theory 
(e.g., Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Bourdieu, 1984; Giddens, 1984; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992) to posit that the social environment plays a decisive role in the development of an 
individual’s system of lasting, transposable dispositions, also called habitus. Agents of
socialisation, such as the family, peer groups and educational institutions, as well as any other 
community or association with which an individual is affiliated, are particularly important in 
this process. Through social interaction, these agents predispose individuals to 
interpretations, meanings, appraisals, and patterns of behaviour, manifested in rules, codes of 
conduct, common ends, beliefs, ideals, and the like (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Thus, 
socialisation shapes an individual’s cognition and, when internalised, operates below the 
level of consciousness (Elias, 1994; Crossley, 2001). In addition, sociological research 
1 University of Marburg. 
German macro: how it’s different and why that matters
suggests that educational and occupational choices may depend on the social environment, 
too (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984).
In our paper, we attempt to understand the specific macroeconomic positions of German 
economists by studying the beliefs held by the human community in which they live, based 
on the idea that these beliefs will have had an influence on the economists’ personal habitus. 
This is an admittedly broad-brush attempt, of course, as the specific socialisation of 
individuals will differ, sometimes significantly. However, since we are trying to understand 
widely-held beliefs of economists, we think that this procedure is valid. In the remainder of 
the paper, we first study attitudes towards inflation (Section 2) and then attitudes towards 
fiscal consolidation (Section 3). Section 4 concludes.
2 Inflation Aversion
Between 1976 and 1993, on average, about 20 per cent of Germans thought fighting inflation 
should be the government’s most important goal.2 Has that changed more recently? Table 1 
reports answers to the question about what Germany’s goals should be in 2011, which was 
asked of a representative sample of the German population.3 The table shows that even 
during periods of very low inflation rates, fighting rising prices is still an important policy 
issue for Germans.
Table 1: Distribution of attitudes towards Germany’s goals
Answer Categories Proportion
Fighting rising prices 32%
Maintaining order 27%
More democracy 27%
Protecting freedom of speech 14%
Total 100%
Notes: Results based on 2,006 observations. The face-to-face interviews were conducted by 
GfK in October 2011.
2 Source: Hayo (1998), reported value derived from Eurobarometer data. 
3 See Hayo and Neuenkirch (2014) for a description of the dataset.
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Hayo (1998) argues that in a comparative analysis of inflation attitudes, it is important to 
control for the current inflation rate. Using a regression approach, he derives estimates of 
inflation sensitivity for various EU countries. In Figure 1, these estimated inflation 
sensitivities are plotted on the horizontal axis and the average rate of inflation in 10 EU 
countries is plotted on the vertical axis. 
According to Figure 1, there is a sizeable negative correlation between a country’s ‘inflation 
sensitivity’ and its average inflation rate. Two countries are highlighted in the figure: Italy, 
reflecting a ‘low inflation sensitivity–high inflation’ combination in the upper-left corner and 
Germany, reflecting a ‘high inflation sensitivity–low inflation’ combination in the lower-right 
corner. Thus, when compared to other Europeans, Germans appear to be particularly 
concerned about price stability.
Figure 1: Inflation sensitivity in the EU 10 and average inflation rates (1976–1993)
But why should Germans be more inflation averse than members of other societies? There are 
at least two reasons for why inflation attitudes may differ: (i) personal experience and (ii) 
inflation culture. Regarding personal experience, Ehrmann and Tzamourani (2012), based on 
World Values Survey data, present evidence that both the experience of relatively high 
inflation rates as well as the specific experience of hyperinflation can result in relatively 
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stronger aversion to rising prices. Thus, personal experience may translate into specific and 
long-lasting attitudes toward inflation.
We do not find this explanation fully satisfactory, however. For one thing, it is based on the 
assumption that first-hand experience is needed to sustain social institutions. In light of the 
existence of many age-old formal and informal institutions in society, this assumption simply 
does not hold in general. For example, certain important events inscribe themselves on the 
‘memory of societies’ to such an extent that, with time, the event stands alone, even though 
everyone who experienced it has died. This is likely to be the case with hyperinflation in 
Germany in the 1920s. Thus, inflation aversion may have become an integral part of people’s 
primary or secondary socialisation, through, for example, their parents, which then works as a 
substitute for personal experience. Moreover, positive experiences with an institution could 
make it self-supporting. For example, after people see that stable prices are possible given a 
specific design of the central bank, they may start supporting the institution itself.
A more general issue is the question of how individual memories feed into the political 
decision-making process. For instance, the hyperinflations listed in Ehrmann and Tzamourani 
(2012) occurred in Germany in the 1920s and in Greece, Italy, and Japan in the mid-1940s. 
Yet, despite these personal inflation memories, Greece and Italy had some of the highest 
inflation rates in Europe in the decades after World War II. 
Thus, it seems likely that over and above any personal memories of inflation, it is a country’s 
‘inflation culture’ that explains differences in inflation attitudes. For instance, De Jong (2002) 
uses a cultural classification developed by Hofstede (1980) to show that basic cultural 
attributes (in the sense of common norms and values), for example, acceptance of an unequal 
power distribution in a society or degree of risk aversion, matter. Countries in which 
inhabitants prefer an order of inequality and a centralisation of authority are characterised by 
low central bank independence; inflation is lower in countries populated by people who 
dislike uncertainty.
Applying a cultural sociology approach, Tognato (2012) argues that a ‘Stabilitätskultur’ 
(stability culture) emerged in Germany following World War II. The impossibility of 
continuing to identify with symbols associated with a morally corrupt political regime 
generated a desire for a new national focal point. The German ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ 
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(economic miracle) provided exactly that and the Deutsche Mark became its symbol. The 
Bundesbank developed into the guardian of this symbol of the ‘new’ Germany, thereby 
winning public acceptance and trust. Hence, the Deutsche Mark evolved from being a mere 
vehicle for facilitating economic exchange to a socially relevant symbol that even had the 
power to unleash emotion such as respect, affection, or even fear. 
To summarise, German economists have been socialised in a society steeped in inflation 
aversion and thus it is not a big surprise that they tend to be concerned about monetary 
policies perceived to endanger price stability. 
3 Public Debt
Our next area of interest is the German public’s attitude towards public debt and fiscal 
consolidation. By means of a telephone survey conducted in Germany in 2011, Heinemann 
and Henninghausen (2012) study individuals’ support for the German federal government’s 
intention not to incur any additional debt in the coming years. The authors discover that 
roughly 68 per cent of the respondents support the government’s consolidation efforts even if 
it means higher taxes or fewer benefits. 
In 2013, we conducted a specially designed representative survey of the German population 
using an extensive questionnaire. In one section of the survey, we asked about respondents’ 
attitude towards fiscal consolidation (Hayo and Neumeier, 2016a). First, we wanted to know 
whether they think the government should reduce public debt, keep the amount of public debt 
at the current level, or incur additional public debt. Second, if respondents were in favour of 
reducing public debt, we asked about their preferred speed of consolidation, that is, 
overproportional debt repayment in the near future, equal repayment over the years, or 
underproportional debt repayment in the near future. Table 2 summarises the relative 
frequency of the various answers, which are sorted from strong to weak consolidation 
preference. 
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Table 2: Distribution of attitudes toward fiscal consolidation
Answer categories Proportion
Reducing a larger part of debt in the near future and a smaller part of 
debt in the far future
15%
Reducing debt evenly over the years 47%
Reducing a smaller part of debt in the near future and a larger part of 
debt in the far future
8%
Hold amount of debt constant 24%
Incur additional debt 2%
Don’t know/no answer (coded as missing values) 5%
Total 100%
Notes: Results based on 2,042 observations. The face-to-face interviews were conducted by 
GfK in February 2013.
We found that a vast majority of Germans—70 per cent—would like to see the amount of 
public debt reduced. More than 45 per cent of all respondents would like to see an even 
distribution of debt repayment over time and 15 per cent prefer reducing a larger part of debt 
in the near future and a smaller part of debt in the far future. Thus, a substantial share of the 
German population favours fiscal consolidation even during the economic crisis in Europe. 
This may help explain why ‘austerity’ measures are viewed rather favourably by both 
German economists and policymakers. 
Regarding fiscal policy flexibility, we asked the respondents about their views on the 
introduction of a balanced-budget rule, the ‘debt brake’, at the constitutional level (Hayo and 
Neumeier, 2016b). From 2016 onward, the structural public budget deficit at the federal 
government level must not exceed 0.35% of GDP. Exceptions can be made only in times of 
economic crises or in the event of a natural disaster. Figure 2 shows the relative frequencies 
of the answer categories. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of attitudes towards the German debt brake
Notes: Results based on 2,042 observations. The face-to-face interviews were conducted by 
GfK in February 2013.
Figure 2 shows that a vast majority, more than 60 per cent, of the population is in favour of 
the debt brake. Moreover, almost 20 per cent of the respondents think that the fiscal 
constraint implied by the debt brake does not go far enough, whereas less than 10 per cent are 
against it. Again, we believe that there is a striking correspondence between these attitudes 
and the positions taken by many German economists and policymakers during the European 
debt crisis. In fact, the German proposal to avoid a repetition of the debt crisis in the future 
was the Fiscal Compact, which is based on the idea of the debt brake.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have taken a look at how the socialisation of German economists influences 
their policy stances. We posit that the relevant social environment for German economists 
will be similar to that of the majority of the German population. Using attitudes towards price 
stability and fiscal consolidation as examples, we show that Germans have clear opinions 
about these specific macroeconomic policy issues. Germans are characterised by a strong 
focus on keeping prices stable, which stands in sharp contrast to a number of other societies 
in Europe. When looking at fiscal consolidation, we find that in the middle of the European 
debt crisis, the German population wanted to see the government making substantial headway 
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in terms of reducing public debt. Furthermore, they favoured severe restraints on fiscal policy 
at the constitutional level, as evidenced by the ‘debt brake’. Thus, we believe it is possible to 
make a strong case for the existence of a ‘stability culture’ in Germany. And, unsurprisingly, 
at least to us, the various views that characterise this stability culture are strikingly similar to 
the positions advocated by German economists and economic policymakers during the recent 
crises in Europe. These include, for instance, their critical stance towards the ECB’s decision 
to adopt quantitative easing and their insistence that Greece begin consolidating its budget in 
the middle of a deep economic recession. 
Assuming a straightforward causal effect from public opinion to the professional views of 
economists and policymakers is probably too simple. It is likely that German economists take 
into account research and opinions from countries other than just Germany. They also play 
some role in shaping the public debate and educating the public. Indeed, it is quite possible 
that some views expressed by the public are simply reflections of what economists advocate. 
However, we doubt economists have much of an impact on the broader German public. Very 
few professional economists appear regularly in mass media; they are not exactly ‘household 
names’. In addition, according to sociologists, the views and values acquired during 
socialisation operate below the level of consciousness and may even affect career decisions. 
That is, individuals who are socialised in an environment where economic questions are 
discussed may later choose to become economists. By then, however, they may already be 
predisposed to certain perspectives about the economy that will have an influence on their 
own views during their professional life. 
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The Germany-South fault line in EMU and the case for a second euro 
by Jacques Mélitz1
1 Introduction
There is a fault line in the EMU. Germany and the Southern members would be better off 
with separate currencies. This does not necessarily call for a return to national monetary 
independence in Southern Europe. Perhaps a second monetary union would be better. This 
would mean two euros in the current Eurozone, one based on the Maastricht Treaty, that 
would surround Germany, and a second one that would be founded on a new monetary 
constitution, to which France would belong together with Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece, 
and there would be exchange rate movement between the two euros.  I would like to develop 
this viewpoint. First, I will discuss the fault line in the system. Based on the argument, no set 
of revisions of the Maastricht Treaty can reconcile the members’ conflicting interests. 
Germany benefits from the Maastricht rules. The Southern European countries and France do 
not. There may have been important policy errors made in the Eurozone. But avoiding these 
mistakes in the future will not suffice. The difficulties are more fundamental. 
After discussing the fault line, I will develop the argument for a second euro in a separate 
section. Support for the EMU today despite its poor performance since 2008 rests largely on 
the view that the problems stem from incomplete political unification. On this view, further 
fiscal union is the answer and nothing must be done to impede its progress. I will also 
respond to this position in the closing section. 
2 The fault line
Germany is an export-oriented economy. Since WWII, the country has generally been able to 
maintain its competitiveness relative to all of its European trade partners without nominal 
exchange rate depreciation. The same cannot be said for some of its European trade partners. 
The Southern European members of the EMU and France have repeatedly required exchange 
1 CREST and CEPII, Paris, December 2015.
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rate depreciation to maintain their competitiveness relative to Germany.  The pattern was set 
from the very start of the European Community (EC) in 1957 (which then comprised only the 
Benelux, France, Germany, and Italy) after post-WWII reconstruction. The German Deutsche 
Mark (DM) emerged early on as a strong currency relative to the other ones in the EC. It 
remained so following the breakdown of Bretton Woods under the ‘European Snake’ (1972-
78) and the subsequent European Monetary System (EMS). Every realignment in the ‘snake’ 
and the EMS saw a rise in the parity of the DM relative to the other currencies in the system 
except the Dutch guilder. Never once did the DM fall in price relative to any other member 
currency.
With the arrival of EMU in 1999, nominal exchange rate adjustment became impossible. 
Such adjustment had already ceased to be much of an option in the mid- to late-nineties for 
those members of the EMS who desired to enter EMU at the start. Notwithstanding, the pre-
EMU pattern re-emerged in the mid-2000s. The important difference is that, in the absence of 
possible exchange rate adjustment, the pattern took the form of huge current account 
imbalances between Germany and the rest. Germany manifested a whopping current account 
surplus of around 6 % of its GDP by 2008 that was essentially matched by deficits in Spain, 
Greece, Italy and Portugal while the EMU as a whole remained in current account balance. 
The situation has basically persisted since. Before the crisis of 2007-08, markets overlooked 
the problem. But starting with the first Greek bailout of May 2010, markets took notice and 
began to lose confidence in the ability of the borrowing members of EMU to repay (as 
witnessed by the emergence of big interest rate premiums on the debts of the governments of 
the borrowing countries). 
It is now clear that the real exchange rate of German goods is much too low for long run 
sustainability of the foreign debt positions of a number of the members of the EMU. Sinn 
(2014, p. 120), who can hardly be suspected of exaggerating Germany’s price advantage, 
proposes an estimate of 20 % for the required appreciation of German goods based on a well-
done Goldman-Sachs study. The same study would imply a required depreciation of 20 to 
30% for Greece, Portugal and Spain for long run sustainability of their foreign debts and, 
more surprisingly, one of 20% for France. The exact numbers2 are not so much the issue as 
2 Which might also differ if the national adjustments took place simultaneously. 
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the fact that little has changed over the last half century or more regarding Germany’s 
tendency to put the Southern European countries and France under relative price pressure. 
It is of the utmost importance that Germany was able to achieve its strong performance since 
2000 in the face of formidable obstacles. The German unification in 1991 had led the country 
deliberately to reduce its competitiveness abroad in order to promote a switch of production 
from export markets to home ones so as to build up infrastructure, clean up pollution and 
bolster construction in the new Eastern länder. The country’s difficulties were heightened by 
its decision to move instantly, without transition, to equal legal treatment of Eastern and 
Western citizens in regard to unemployment benefits, public health and retirement insurance, 
public-sector wages and inter-länder transfers. As a result, Germany’s tradable goods sector 
was confronted at once with both an appreciation of the Deutsche Mark and a substantial rise 
in its tax burden. 
In accordance with the policy designs, the current account balance of the country turned 
negative in 1991 and remained so to the tune of around 0.8 of 1 percent of GDP for five 
consecutive years in 1991-1995 (OECD Economic Surveys). During that period, the 
country’s real effective exchange rate rose by about 15 percent (World Economic Indicators). 
At some point, however, the problem was to switch back to the normal state of affairs where 
exports spearheaded growth of the economy. This meant bringing the real exchange rate back 
down and improving competitiveness. However, by the mid- to late nineties the run-up to 
EMU had begun and nominal exchange rate depreciation had ceased to be a political option. 
This is when Germany’s achievement becomes truly impressive.  The entire appreciation of 
the real effective exchange rate through 1991-95 was erased by 2000-02. The current account 
returned to balance in the same years. From 2002 on, the country marched forward to the 
large current account surpluses to which reference was made above. 
How did this happen? As Carlin and Soskice (2009) explain, most of the answer lies in wage 
discipline. Consumption-wages fell in the tradable goods sector through wage restraint. The 
net profit share in manufacturing rose from 5 to 15 percent in 1995-2005 (p. 75). Yet so great 
were the economic problems posed by unification that those years were also ones of mediocre 
or fair aggregate output and unemployment performance, and they were so not only 
nationally but in relation to the country’s European partners. Then came the German
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response. The country adopted the Hartz reforms of the labour market in 2003, also known as 
Agenda 2010. These reforms ended long-term unemployment insurance and brought down 
unemployment benefits to the level of ordinary welfare support. The reforms are widely 
credited with contributing much to the relatively good output and employment performance 
of the country since 2005 or over the last ten years. The added wage discipline reinforced the 
competitiveness of Germany’s export sector, which had already been impressive earlier, as 
noted before. The added wage discipline also contributed to strengthening the country’s 
current account balance. 
In sum, to all indications, Germany can handle its employment, economic and trade problems 
without independent monetary policy. The country needs little or no compensation for its 
surrender of monetary independence through collective insurance. As a result, there is little or 
no basis for striking a satisfactory deal in the Eurozone. I would like to develop this argument 
further.  
Consider a group of countries who expect no real exchange rate movement in relation to one 
another. If they form a monetary union, they can partly compensate for their sacrifice of 
independence of their nominal exchange rate through programmes of joint insurance. The 
insurance can provide all of them some extra security at no expected cost. It can relate to 
unemployment, recession, financial-sector illiquidity, financial-sector insolvency, or all four. 
Suppose next that one member can expect to place the rest continuously under competitive 
price pressure.  Let us assume a zero rate of inflation in the monetary union as a whole.  Then 
in the long run this particular member will require a secular rise in nominal wages and prices 
to keep its total lending to the rest from rising in perpetuity and the borrowing members will 
require a secular fall in nominal wages and prices to keep their borrowing in check. But we 
know from wide macroeconomic evidence that we must then expect the countries that 
undergo the deflation to experience most of the strains in unemployment, output and finance. 
This last section of the union therefore can expect to be a net recipient of the insurance 
payments. The so-called insurance scheme is partly a plan of systematic transfer and 
redistribution.  Unfortunately, this describes the situation in the Eurozone pretty well.
As a fundamental factor, Germany anticipated the problem from the start and as the dominant 
player in the construction of EMU was able to do something about it. The monetary 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty are adapted to limit Germany’s risks. By intent, the ECB 
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is a weak central bank. This is not sufficiently appreciated. The ECB does not have as much 
monetary control as central banks are usually supposed to have. It has no clear mandate to 
engage in ordinary open market operations. The texts do not explicitly allow the ECB simply 
to purchase a government bond and increase the monetary base at will in the typical textbook 
manner. According to the logic of the Treaty, such action would be tantamount to permitting 
the central bank to favour the financing of a particular lower-level government. It would be 
like letting the Federal Reserve increase the monetary base by purchasing the bonds of 
Illinois (a state in financial difficulty). Instead, the Treaty makes monetary control by the 
ECB contingent on the willingness of commercial banks to lend to individual firms and 
households. If one searches the Eurosystem literature for the term ‘open market operations,’ 
he/she will find that it describes quantitative allotments of refinancing that must still be 
initiated by the private banks. Since 2010 the term has also sometimes served to refer - first, 
under the ‘Securities Markets Programme’ and more recently under the programme of 
‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ - to purchases of bonds of member governments that are 
under financial stress with various strings attached. These are not open market operations in 
the ordinary sense. In addition, there is no provision for the ECB to act as a lender of last 
resort in the Maastricht Treaty. Needless to say, the Maastricht Treaty also does not provide 
for the collective fiscal support of the payments system in the case of danger to the system 
stemming from the collapse of the banking sector in any particular region. 
All this makes perfect sense from a German point of view. But how reasonable are these 
provisions from the standpoint of a large segment of the other members of EMU? It was 
clearly of no help to a majority of the population in the euro area that once the official 
intervention rate on the interbank market approached the zero interest rate floor in 2008-10, 
the Maastricht rules left the ECB powerless to increase the money supply at all without 
engaging in legally questionable actions or emergency measures that required bending the 
rules. As a result, unsustainable premiums on Spanish and Italian bonds were able to arise in 
late 2011 following the second Greek bail-out (when the private lenders took a hit). It is 
clearly a good bet that those premiums would not have arisen if the ECB had possessed the 
ordinary ability of a central bank to raise the monetary base at will. As evidence, it sufficed 
for the President of the ECB simply to announce (July 27, 2012) that “within [our] mandate,” 
the Bank would “do whatever it takes to preserve the euro” to bring down the interest rate 
differentials to manageable size.  Very significantly, though, the President’s statement was 
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legally questionable, as some German observers, including leading members of the CES-IFO
in Munich (Sinn and Fuest), did not fail to point out. The decision of the Court of Karlsruhe 
on February 7, 2014 reinforces this point of view. The German constitutional court explicitly 
rejects the ECB’s argument that its responsibility to save the EMU is grounds for the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme. True, in a more recent decision (June 16, 2015), 
the European Court of Justice upheld the legality of OMT, contrary to the German court. 
True too, by the previous March the ECB had begun a ‘quantitative easing’ programme, the 
closest thing to a programme of open market operations to appear thus far, but it did so as an 
emergency action outside the Maastricht Treaty. The recent refugee crisis in Europe has also 
allowed this initiative to go forward with far less resistance from Germany than it would 
otherwise have met.
In addition, unlike the situation in the U.S. during the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s and 
1990s, once the financial crisis of 2007-08 hit, the Irish paid for the insolvency of their 
banking sector, the Spanish paid predominantly for theirs, and in Cyprus, it even looked for a 
while that small bank depositors would have to contribute heavily to pay for theirs following 
the second Greek bail-out in late 2011.  
3 The case for a second euro
These observations naturally pose the question of whether a number of the countries in the 
Eurozone would not do better to form a second euro system based on a different set of rules. I 
believe this to be a serious question. Studies of business cycle symmetry in the EC in the run-
up to EMU generally tended to show differences North-South but never any major 
differences in the cyclical performance of the Southern economies and France (see, e.g., 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992). Since EMU, the trade performances of the Southern group 
and France have not revealed any need for notable relative price changes within the group. 
Therefore, if these countries formed a separate monetary union, they would have little reason 
to hesitate to adopt a strong central bank in order to arm themselves with adequate 
macroeconomic policy tools. They would then at last have a central bank capable and fully 
licensed to engage in open market operations independently of commercial banks’ desire for 
liquidity and with the power of lender of last resort. The countries could also adopt joint 
deposit insurance and a joint bank resolution fund based on ordinary principles of insurance. 
Though they would no longer form as large a currency area as before, they would still 
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constitute a large one and therefore would keep many of the benefits of a single currency and 
capital market integration.  Notably, by choosing to form a monetary union rather than opt for 
separate currencies, they would avoid the Nash consequences of non-cooperative games 
among themselves via exchange rate competition. If we judge from their earlier behaviour 
between the breakdown of Bretton Woods and EMU, there is reason to believe that these 
countries (clearly France and Italy) put weight on avoiding such Nash consequences. In 
addition, of course, the members would profit from exchange rate flexibility relative to 
Germany.3
Of course, some precautions would be necessary for the expected benefits. Arming the new 
central bank with full powers of open market operations does pose an issue of moral hazard. 
But a number of satisfactory responses to the problem have been offered. The ‘Blue bond’ 
proposal of Depla and Weizsäcker (2012) is one. The euro-nomics group (Brunnermeier et al, 
2012) makes a particularly attractive suggestion. The group proposes creating a new 
intermediary (which they call the ‘European Debt Agency’) that would hold an imposed 
combination of government securities (in fixed, irreversible weights) against which the 
intermediary would issue new securities (which they term ‘European Safe Bonds’) to the 
public that the central bank could subsequently buy and sell. The nice thing about this 
proposal is that it demonstrates the lack of any need to go even so far as to introduce new 
joint government bonds in order to provide for ordinary open market operations without 
creating moral hazard.
In addition, the proposed collective insurance clearly calls for banking union. Indeed the right 
sort of banking union would be stronger than any currently envisaged under that name in the 
EMU and stronger still than anything that can be expected to happen with German consent. 
The right action would be to treat all banks in the euro area as euro institutions, subject to 
progressively harmonized rules, and under the supervision of euro-wide authorities with far 
greater powers than the current European Banking Authority has. The relevant rules of bank 
behaviour would best include strict limits on the ability to hold home-government debts. 
Otherwise the joint bank resolution fund would be difficult to interpret as strict risk reduction 
and insurance.
3 I have developed the argument in this paragraph more fully in Mélitz (2014). 
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However, if constructed properly, the second euro would even heighten fiscal discipline. The 
member governments would lose most if not all of their privileged access to home banks in 
order to finance deficits. In this way, the new rules would also break the ‘doom loop’ or 
‘diabolic loop’ between government financing and bank financing that economists have 
identified as a particularly dangerous element of the current situation (Baldwin and Giavazzi, 
2015, Brunnermeier et al, 2012, and Shambaugh, 2012).4 Finally, nothing in the proposal 
would prevent the members of the second euro from sticking to the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) and the more recent Fiscal Compact Treaty.  
4 Conclusion
In closing, I would like to respond to two objections. The first is that the transition to the 
second euro would be unworkable. In answer, it should be noted that the costliness of the 
transition depends on when and how the reform takes place. The costs (that is, the 
opportunity costs) would be much lower in a period of storm, when the whole system is in 
danger of crashing. If a major reform is necessary anyway, then all the alternatives are costly. 
Yet if this is so, should we not entertain the merit of the proposal at all times in order to have 
a better idea of the direction we would like to go if the occasion arises and of which way we 
might like to lean at present? In addition, Dobbs (2012) makes an interesting suggestion 
about holding down the costs of an eventual transition (subsequently summarized in Dobbs 
and Spence, 2012). She considers a break-up of the euro into two or more currencies. The 
basic inspiration comes from equity finance when there is about to be a merger, buy-out or 
stock split.  The idea is to let the market know in advance that all outstanding euro claims 
will have the same composite value of both (all 3, all 4, etc.) euros after the split no matter 
what people do with their assets or liabilities right now. Avoiding one-way bets if a break-up 
looms ahead is obviously fundamental.
Perhaps the most important objection to my proposal is the danger of any political division 
between Germany and France. Granted, any currency split between these two could have 
wider political repercussions. Though the proposal does not put into question any political 
institution in the EU besides the Eurosystem, it does go counter to any broader vision of a 
4 The ‘doom loop’ refers to the unfortunate sequence of events that we have witnessed in Europe where a home 
government first bails out home banks and in the aftermath the banks invest heavily in associated new 
government debt issues and the banks and the government now find themselves jointly at risk.
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political union in the EU in the future. In this connection, last June 3rd, the respective 
Ministers of Finance in France and Germany, Emmanuel Macron and Sigmar Gabriel, issued 
a joint statement (repeated by Macron in an interview in the Süddeutsche Zeitung
International last August 31) drawing up a broad design for a fiscal union and calling for 
advance toward the goal in order to save the euro. Yet no visible movement in that direction 
has occurred since; not even the slightest progress toward implementing the Single Bank 
Resolution Fund, the most important element of fiscal union on the political agenda. The 
problem of the refugees from Syria and the Near East may have intervened. 
In any event, on my analysis there is a fundamental reason not to rest hope in this direction. 
The difficulty is that in the long run the Southern European countries and France can only 
benefit from a common currency with Germany on conditions that would be disadvantageous 
to Germany. The former countries require some insurance for the abandonment of their 
monetary independence which amounts to expected fiscal transfers from Germany. From the 
German side, therefore, the Macron-Gabriel proposal makes little political sense. This is a 
deep obstacle.  In light of it, I believe, failure to consider a second euro may be burying one’s 
head in the sand. 
There have undoubtedly been mistakes in managing the euro since the crisis. However,  
avoiding those policy mistakes in the future would not be enough. True, as widely recognized 
at long last, it was a mistake to invite markets to think that the ‘no bail-out’ clause of the 
Maastricht Treaty along with the SGP implied that the debts of all member governments 
could be treated as nearly perfect substitutes. It was also a mistake not to write down 
Greece’s debts to private creditors in May 2010, only to do so later in November 2011 after 
the situation had worsened, and it was probably a further mistake not to write down the total 
Greek debt more than was done either in 2011 or since. Yet had these policy mistakes not 
happened, Ireland, Portugal and Spain would not have escaped the miseries they faced after 
2008 and the whole system would still probably have been shaken by a loss of market 
confidence. The blame for the troubles in Ireland, Portugal and Spain, which spread to Italy 
and threatened France, lies in the weakness of the ECB and the lack of any sort of joint 
insurance in the Eurosystem.  Yet these features of the system are also a part of a deliberate 
German design. If we cannot even argue today that Germany was wrong to choose this 
design, fiscal union cannot go far. Should we therefore not consider the possibility of a 
second euro?  
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Property rights, moral hazard and hysteresis 
by Charles Wyplosz1
During the Eurozone crisis, moral hazard has often been invoked to discuss policy options. 
Unfortunately, many of the subtleties of the concept have been lost in the debate and wrong 
decisions have been taken because of its improper use. Once these decisions have changed 
the landscape, moral hazard has taken on new meaning and introduced a sharp disagreement 
between some leading German economists and their colleagues. 
1 Principles
Early on, when the Greek crisis erupted, policymakers insisted that debts have to be repaid.
Otherwise, they observed, a bad precedent would be established. This is a strong argument, 
but that cannot be the end of it. Obviously, it must be the rule that debts are honoured. 
Without this rule, there can be no lending. More widely, for debts to exist, there must be clear 
and enforced property rights. Yet, property rights are neither uniquely defined nor absolute 
(Demsetz, 1967). Similarly, rules usually include escape clauses to be invoked in rare 
unexpected circumstances. 
The risk of a bad precedent is directly related to moral hazard. To recall, moral hazard occurs 
whenever someone takes risky decisions in the expectation that someone else will bear some 
of the costs that would arise if the action leads to losses. Yet, that does not imply that debts 
should never be written down. To start with, it is crucial to note that the reason why debt 
write-downs are undesirable is not that losses will be borne by an ‘innocent bystander’, but 
that it provides perverse incentives. One-off losses are bygones; if they do not affect future 
behavior, they do not create any moral hazard. In addition, it matters whether there are indeed 
innocent bystanders. Public debts are a two-way street. Governments may borrow without 
restraint if they expect that some of the debt will be written down. This is moral hazard, but 
lenders may also disregard risks and lend too much if they expect that someone else will pick 
up the debt if the borrower cannot honour it. They are not innocent bystanders. This too is 
moral hazard. 
1 Graduate Institute, Geneva.
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2 Misleading application of principles
The decision to exclude any debt relief for the Greek government, and then for other 
governments, was made at the outset of the crisis. It is not an incontrovertible implication of 
the sanctity of property rights and of moral hazard. When instead Greece was ordered to 
borrow and to accept a whole range of conditions, many property rights were violated. For 
instance, Greek workers whose wages were slashed underwent a unilateral alteration of their 
work contracts. They were as close to innocent bystanders as one can imagine. The same 
cannot be said about bankers who had lent unreasonable amounts to successive Greek 
governments. 
Focusing on the borrowing, not on the lending, side as a source of moral hazard was entirely 
a policy choice. It matters that French and German banks were among the large lenders and 
that their managers were ‘advising’ their governments.2 At any rate, there was nothing moral 
about that. For, if we start delving into morality issues, we could take a leaf from an 
undisputed authority, the Bible, and reach the opposite conclusion: 
“23 Therefore the kingdom of heaven may be compared to a king who wished to settle 
accounts with his servants. 24 When he began to settle, one was brought to him who owed him 
ten thousand talents. 25 And since he could not pay, his master ordered him to be sold, with 
his wife and children and all that he had, and payment to be made. 26 So the servant fell on his 
knees, imploring him, ‘Have patience with me, and I will pay you everything.’ 27 And out of 
pity for him, the master of that servant released him and forgave him the debt. 28 But when 
that same servant went out, he found one of his fellow servants who owed him a hundred 
denarii, and seizing him, he began to choke him, saying, ‘Pay what you owe.’ 29 So his fellow 
servant fell down and pleaded with him, ‘Have patience with me, and I will pay you.’ 30 He 
refused and went and put him in prison until he should pay the debt. 31 When his fellow 
servants saw what had taken place, they were greatly distressed, and they went and reported 
to their master all that had taken place. 32 Then his master summoned him and said to him, 
‘You wicked servant! I forgave you all that debt because you pleaded with me. 33 And should 
2 On the role of the Chairman of BNP-Parisbas, see ‘BNP Paris Chairman to Retire’, Financial Times, 9 May 
2011. On the role of the CEO of Deutschebank, see ‘Deutsche Bank’s Chief Casts Long Shadow in Europe’ 
New York Times, 11 June 2011. 
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not you have had mercy on your fellow servant, as I had mercy on you?’ 34 And in anger his 
master delivered him to the jailers, until he should pay all his debt. 35 So also my heavenly 
Father will do to every one of you, if you do not forgive your brother from your heart.” 
Matthew 18:23–35 
3 Most economists agreed
Many German economists graced the profession by publicly disagreeing with their 
government. A Plenum of 189 German economists published a statement that condemned the 
Greek bailout and called instead for debt restructuring.3 Their argument was that some debts 
are so high that they will never be repaid, as also argued in Portes (2011) and Wyplosz (2009, 
2011a) among others. They correctly noted that permanent credit is a source of moral hazard, 
in contrast with a never-again write-down. They remained silent, however, on how to make 
sure that it would not be repeated, yet they observed that the Stability and Growth Pact would 
not do the trick. Importantly for what was to follow, they warned that the ECB should refrain 
from buying distressed public debts. 
4 Hysteresis
Once the policy had been set, the situation changed dramatically. The treatment imposed on 
Greece was quasi-automatically reproduced in Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and, implicitly, in 
Spain. These countries were forced to borrow large amounts that massively increased their 
public debts. In return, they were requested to promptly reduce their budget deficits, which 
meant carrying out procyclical fiscal policies in the midst of historic economic depressions. 
As a consequence, the Eurozone became highly unstable as the soaring interest rate premia 
showed. In this desperate situation, crucial actions were needed and there were no good 
options. Each option was a distant Nth best, implying acute tradeoffs. This is where many 
German economists parted ways from their foreign colleagues. This was a sort of hysteresis 
effect on economic analysis. 
3 A presentation in English is Merz et al. (2011). 
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5 Disagreements set in
The first challenge was Greece and its soaring public debt, which kept alarming the markets. 
The policymakers finally recognized that some debt relief was unavoidable. The chosen 
solution was Private Sector Involvement (PSI), a default imposed on the private debt holders 
in 2012. By then, much of the private debt had been sold by banks to the public sector, 
including the EFSF and the ECB. Most of the private bond holders were Greek and Cypriot 
banks. There was limited debate among economists. In fact, it befell to some German 
economists (working abroad) to show that the bondholders were treated surprisingly 
generously, a clear instance of moral hazard (Hau, 2011; Zettemeyer et al., 2013).
The second challenge was to stabilize the whole of the Eurozone. The decisive step was taken 
by the ECB in September 2012 with its Open Market Transactions (OMT) programme. Moral 
hazard issues were now on the front burner. Once again, the issue was that the readiness of 
the ECB to buy bonds issued by now-distressed governments would provide incentives to 
build debt up again in the future. Of course, there was another side of the coin: the lending by 
the ECB was a risk that could cost taxpayers a lot. On the other hand, bringing interest rate 
spreads down in the teeth of acute financial market stress could only be achieved through a 
central bank commitment because central banks are unique in being able to make 
commitments of unlimited size. In other words, the ECB had to act as lender of last resort for 
distressed public debt. 
As is well known, the Chairman of the Bundesbank dissented – and eventually resigned, 
ostensibly as a protest gesture – when the Governing Council of the Eurosystem took the 
decision. He was backed by a majority of German economists while non-German economists 
had long called for the move, which instantly brought lasting relief.4 In fact, some German 
legal scholars took the issue to the German Constitutional Court, asking that the OMT 
programme should be ruled to have violated the German constitution.5 Even though the 
programme was widely held to have been highly efficient in calming market tensions, 
4 An assortment of views can be found on the website of VoxEU. Among those calling for an ECB backstop are 
Delbecque (2011), Padoan et al. (2012), Wyplosz (2011b). German opposition, represented by Sinn (2011), was 
widespread as indicated below. 
5 This was a second attempt. In 2010, the same group had asked the Court to declare the Securities Market 
Programme (SMP) carried out by the ECB in 2010-11 illegal. The Court decided that the programme was legal 
but under these conditions: 1) that the commitment be explicitly limited ex ante; 2) that any loan involving 
German taxpayers be approved by the Bundestag. 
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without the ECB having to intervene at all, the German Constitutional Court indicated that it 
would determine whether OMTs were part of the monetary policy mandate of the ECB. The 
Court conducted hearings of some German economists, who argued that the OMT 
programme was not within the ECB’s monetary policy mandate (Sinn, 2013). Concerned that 
a national court was about to decide what is monetary policy in the Eurozone, five European 
economists, backed by 246 economists from around the world, including Germans, issued a 
statement calling on the Court to desist (Fratzscher et al., 2013). This led 136 German 
economics professors to issue their own statement, reproduced in the Wall Street Journal of 
11 September 2013. They argued that “money finance of governments is rightly prohibited 
because it endangers the central bank’s independence from governments. The central bank’s 
duty is maintaining price stability, it is not reducing the sovereign risk premia member states 
have to pay in bond markets.” 
6 Interpretations
Both the 2011 call by 189 German economists and the 2013 call by international economists 
recognized the moral hazard issue but concluded that the economic risks were pressing and 
threatening enough to take precedence. The call by the 136 German economics professors 
focused on the legal obligations of the ECB, ignoring the risks. They echoed Sinn’s testimony 
to the Constitutional Court, summarized in Sinn (2013), who considered that if the risks were 
deemed too high for some countries, then these countries should leave the Eurozone. Legal 
obligations (more precisely, their interpretation of the treaties) and associated moral hazard 
trumped the integrity of the Eurozone. The sharp disagreement was not really about economic 
analysis but rather about how to deal with the tradeoff between conflicting principles. 
This is not surprising. When it comes to determining the Nth best solution, economists 
disagree because no model is complete enough to provide an undisputed solution. In fact 
some German economists backed the ‘international view’ while some non-German 
economists sided with the ‘German view’. Yet, it is worth noting that legal considerations 
were seen as dominating in the German call while their opponents described them as a matter 
of interpretation. Clearly, ordoliberal principles dominate among German economists. This, 
however, is not the whole story. The call by the 136 German economics professors and Sinn 
(2013) explicitly referred to German interests while their opponents explicitly presented their 
arguments from a Eurozone viewpoint. 
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This surprising nationalistic approach is mirrored in the German Constitutional Court rulings. 
The first one, concerning the SMP programme, did not hesitate to subject Eurozone decisions 
to Bundestag approval, in effect giving the parliament a right of veto. The second ruling 
expressed grave reservations about the OMT programme’s compatibility with German basic 
law. It asked the opinion of the European Court of Justice on whether the programme was 
compatible with Europe’s primary law, while retaining the right to subsequently declare the 
programme illegal in Germany. The European Court ruled that there was no such 
incompatibility. The German Constitutional Court has not (yet?) followed up on its threat, 
which remains in place. 
Is Germany more nationalistic than other countries? Another striking feature of the Eurozone 
crisis has been that similar tendencies have emerged among economists from other countries. 
For instance, majorities of economists from periphery countries under stress have come out in 
favor of Eurobonds, which imply joint European responsibility for national debts. In effect, 
this means that countries saddled with large debts could expect a guarantee from countries in 
a better position. When it comes to identify Nth best solutions, apparently, economists are 
surprisingly sensitive to home interests. 
7 So are German economists really different? 
A counterfactual may help in answering the question. Assume that Greece, or Italy, is the 
largest and most powerful country in the Eurozone. They would have argued in favour of 
debt relief or Eurobonds, and this is what would have happened. They would have exploited 
the myriad of economic theory ambiguities to make their point. They would not have sought 
to debate with their fellows from other countries. Call it the danger of hegemony. 
The answer to hegemony is proper institutions. We need to develop a crisis management 
framework. We need to better define the role of the ECB. We need to free the central bank 
from the whims of national constitutional courts. And, we all agree, we need to restore the 
no-bailout rule. As economic historians teach us, if applied, this rule would have saved us 
most of the subsequent disagreements (Bordo et al., 2011). 
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The Eurocrisis response: towards a German Europe?
by Fabian Zuleeg1
1 Introduction
This essay discusses the policy response to the crisis which has gripped the Eurozone for the 
last few years from the perspective of how influential German economic thinking has been in 
shaping this policy response. In particular, it assesses how far the economic philosophy of 
Ordoliberalism or ‘Ordnungspolitik’ has been the driver behind European austerity and its 
attempted enforcement.
2 What is Ordoliberalism and how does it influence the EU?
It is difficult to find a comprehensive definition of German Ordoliberalism. Broadly 
speaking, it is the belief that there is a strong role for the state in defining a framework for 
economic interaction but that the state should not interfere beyond this. In other words, it is a 
rules-based system, with a legal underpinning to enforce these rules and no or limited 
flexibility, ideally enforced by independent institutions, such as the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court) or the Bundesbank. It implies that 
individual economic and political actors cannot be trusted in crisis situations and need to be 
constrained by effective rules to prevent sub-optimal outcomes.
Such a system is seen by its proponents as providing a large degree of stability and 
predictability. This is often contrasted to politicians trying to influence political 
developments, especially elections, by providing a short term fiscal stimulus or windfall gain 
that will prove costly in the long run, or, by circumventing the rules, undermining the long 
term credibility of the whole system. 
The underpinning philosophy of Ordoliberalism appears to appeal to many in Germany, with 
a strong preference for rules-based systems coupled with a distrust of ‘Anglo-Saxon Casino 
Capitalism’ and a strong, historically-rooted aversion to economic instability, debt, inflation 
1 Chief Executive and Chief Economist, European Policy Centre.
German macro: how it’s different and why that matters
and its political consequences. Throughout the crisis there was reference to the Swabian 
Housewife as a reminder to everybody that ‘you cannot live beyond your means’.2 While it 
can be debated whether this general perception of economic policy is part of Ordo-liberalism, 
it is the combination of such attitudes with the rules-based, legalistic system that has 
influenced the EU debate.
When applied to interactions between the EU’s Member States, Ordoliberalism implies 
adherence to the rules laid down in the Treaties, with little room for political negotiations or 
open-ended commitments such as the ones made by the ECB later in the crisis. Within the 
debate on Eurozone governance, it has been argued that this philosophy is behind the 
inflexible response to the Eurocrisis.3 When countries were starting to run into public debt 
problems, the emphasis was on maintaining the rules and instilling greater fiscal discipline, 
with new economic governance instruments being created where implementation of the rules 
in the Treaties, in particular the Stability and Growth Pact, was seen as too weak.4
3 Germany – the constrained hegemon
This narrative of the crisis raises the question of how effective German dominance is within 
the Eurozone. Undoubtedly, with the crisis, Germany has become the most influential 
country in the Eurozone, as well as the wider EU, not least as any Eurozone response that 
requires funding has to be underpinned by Germany. Politically, Germany has been very 
visible, both in the discussion of how the existing rules need to be enforced and in judicial 
challenges to what some see as ‘excessive’ flexibility or even illegal overreaching of their 
competences by EU institutions such as the ECB. Equally, Germany has been influential in 
determining what new rules might be necessary to enforce fiscal discipline, including the 
Fiscal Compact,5 which in essence translates the German debt brake to the European level. 
During the crisis the role of Germany has changed: while in the past Germany was willing to 
subsume its national economic interest to the European integration process, this is no longer 
2 See also The Economist (2014).
3 See e.g. Dullien and Guérot (2012). 
4 European Commission (2015), Stability and Growth Pact website.
5 The Fiscal Compact is part of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union signed on 2 March 2012, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-
council/pdf/Treaty-on-Stability-Coordination-and-Governance-TSCG/.
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the case. In this sense, Germany has become a normal country: it pursues its national interest, 
using the power at its disposal.6
But German hegemony does not describe EMU governance accurately. Despite the political 
and economic strength of Germany, no single country can dominate the EU, not least because 
the system has been designed to protect the smaller countries from domination by the bigger 
ones. EU policy-making is based on building coalitions rather than having a single country 
dominating. German influence is thus biggest when actions are taken outside the Community-
method (such as the Fiscal Compact, which is an inter-governmental treaty), when new 
instruments are created that contain implicit or explicit veto powers for the countries 
providing the funding (e.g. the European Stability Mechanism7) or when countries are in such 
financial difficulty that they have to accept stringent conditions (economic reforms under 
support programmes, enforced through the Troika). Conversely, in the creation of new EU 
rules or in the ‘normal’ application of these rules, German influence is more limited, mainly 
constituting a quasi-veto power for new provisions or transfers of competence to the EU 
level. 
4 Rules vs. reality
Even this quasi-veto power of Germany is either weak or not exercised consistently at EU 
level, as evidenced by a wide range of policies which have been introduced despite initial 
German resistance. The list of spurned German demands is rather long: no debt bail-out for 
countries in financial difficulties, no activism by the European Central Bank, no debt 
forgiveness, no flexibility for government deficits, no banking union with cross-border 
implications etc. All of these demands have, more or less, been rejected in recent years. 
While many (especially outside orthodox German economic circles) will contend that this 
was necessary and desirable, it flies in the face of the perceived power of Germany and the 
influence of Ordoliberalism which many have claimed.
There are many reasons why this might have been the case. Most importantly, there is an 
overarching need to take action to ensure systemic stability which provides a rationale for
taking even unorthodox actions: preventing the collapse of the Euro or of Europe’s banks, or 
6 See also Zuleeg (2015c).
7 European Stability Mechanism website, http://www.esm.europa.eu/.
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the political break-down of the EU, is worth almost any price. In the end, this kind of political 
consideration has always overridden the underlying economic principles. 
Historically, the rules-based system has also been undermined by Germany itself, as clearly 
seen by the weakening of the Stability and Growth Pact by France and Germany in 2005.8 A 
rules-based system can only be credible at EU level if applied to all Member States. The 
resistance of German politicians to the application of the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure to the German current account surplus is a more recent case in point.9 Differences 
between key actors in Germany have also played a role: while Finance Minister Schäuble can 
be seen as broadly signing up to the main tenants of Ordoliberalism, it is far from clear 
whether this is shared by Chancellor Merkel.10
5 An economic governance under strain
But those in Germany who claim that there is something wrong in European governance also 
have a point. European economic governance cannot rely on rules alone but there is a level of 
trust which is necessary, between Member States and between the Member States and the 
institutions.11 This level of trust has eroded to dangerously low levels on all sides. The 
problem of ex post opportunism continues to be present; in other words, once a country has 
received support and is no longer in an existential crisis, the incentive to carry out reforms 
and consolidate public finances is no longer present, especially where there is strong populist 
resistance. 
In addition, the new economic governance mechanisms, and in particular the European 
Semester, are not changing countries’ behaviours, especially not in terms of carrying out 
necessary economic reforms. In part, this can be explained by the unchanged political 
framework: decisions are still legitimised through national elections.12 However, this does not 
help to make support for other countries more acceptable in countries like Germany, 
especially if there is a perception that there are no effective sanction regimes or even the 
ultimate consequence of exclusion from the Eurozone for persistent offenders. 
8 See also Reiermann and Wiegrefe (2012).
9 See also Schneider, Zuleeg, and Emmanouilidis (2014). 
10 See also Schieritz (2015).
11 See also Zuleeg (2015b).
12 See also Zuleeg (2015a). 
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6 Implications for the future
What does this mean for the future? Undoubtedly, Germany has become politically stronger, 
with some elements of dominance, especially in relation to the Eurozone. This is unlikely to 
change and makes a stand-off like the one with the new Greek Government in the summer of 
2015 more likely. At the same time, an isolated Germany or Germany in combination with a 
small number of countries cannot impose a policy on the rest of the Eurozone or even 
individual countries, unless they are in acute crisis. The result is a stalemate, with no 
significant further deepening of EMU possible unless a solution can be found that satisfies all 
sides. 
What the EU is currently facing is not the prospect of a German Europe, with ordo-liberal 
and austerity policies being forced onto other Member States. Rather, the EU faces a period 
where effective decision-making is under severe strain. To make further progress, the 
European economic framework will have to contain both elements: support for economically 
weaker countries but also mechanisms to ensure countries carry out reforms; in European 
jargon, solidarity and responsibility. With this in mind, it could be worth revisiting the so-
called contractual arrangements, i.e. commitments by member states to carry out reforms in 
return for support, as this could overcome the political blockage that is preventing the 
development of a fiscal capacity.13 The existing fiscal rules should also be complemented by 
a Golden Rule which provides Member States with some flexibility to increase social and 
public investments.14
But in truth, the erosion in decision-making capacity goes far further than the EMU crisis, 
where at least some progress has been made. The refugee crisis is also posing similar 
questions of responsibility and solidarity, albeit with some countries being affected 
differently than in the Eurocrisis. So, paradoxically, what Europe needs is more Germany but 
a Germany that recognises that its relative hegemony implies that it needs to take the lead in
constructing European compromises that can take the EU forward to overcome its poly-crisis. 
Without this recognition, there is a danger that the greatest experiment in creating a stability 
13 See also Zuleeg (2015c).
14 See also Zuleeg and Schneider (2015).
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mechanism and the rule of law across Europe is undermined over time, threatening the 
outcomes Ordoliberalism strives to achieve. 
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